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Uncertainty affects both the demand and supply sides in industrial practice. Un-
certainty in demand may increase the production costs. Uncertainty in earnings cash
flows might result in high borrowing costs and budget problems. Variations in the
external economic condition could greatly impact the product prices. This thesis
presents three essays that price, manage, and understand the aforementioned uncer-
tainties in different industrial settings.
In Chapter II, we study just-in-time outsourcing between an original equipment
manufacturer (OEM) and a contract manufacturer (CM). Both the OEM and the
CM have flexible production capacity and concave earnings in capacity usage. Un-
der the just-in-time contract, the CM assumes demand risks from the OEM at the
expense of her profit margins, because the CM is not explicitly compensated for the
cost of the demand uncertainty. In this paper we price the demand risks from both
agents’ perspectives using marginal utility pricing theory, accounting for the demand
pooling effect under flexible capacity. We show that when the outsourcing demand
is positively correlated with the agent’s existing business, the higher risk it carries,
the more it benefits the OEM, and less the CM. Furthermore, we introduce risk ratio
to measure the “riskiness” of the outsourcing business. Particularly, the risk ratio
quantifies the extent to which the CM’s gross profit margin is eroded. Finally, we
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apply our model to a data set of a Norwegian auto-parts CM serving 11 OEMs. We
report that while three OEMs’ orders are more risky and costly than others, none of
these outsourcing businesses’ risk ratios exceeds the CM’s gross profit margin. This
agrees with our expectation given the CM’s healthy business and prudence in selecting
customers.
Managed services is a rapidly growing industry that offers IT infrastructure man-
agement for companies and institutions. In Chapter III, we conduct an in-depth
study on managed services in the context of managed print services (MPS) by ex-
amining the contractual interactions between the MPS provider and his institutional
customers using a proprietary data set. On the customer’s side, we demonstrate that
the customer’s printing demand is insensitive to service prices over the observed con-
tracts. Furthermore, we show that individual institutional customer’s valuation of
the service is dominated by the population valuation, despite of the heterogeneity
in the customers’ industries and negotiation processes. In particular, the population
valuation of the service decreases with the printer fleet size, suggesting the market
power of large companies. On the provider’s side, we empirically show that given the
customer’s service valuation, the provider decides the optimal contracts accounting
not only for the expected earnings but also for the variability of earnings; that is,
the provider is risk-averse. Based on our model and data, all customers, irrespective
of their industries and fleet sizes, bring in similar risk-adjusted earnings. This may
indicate intense competition among the providers as different customers’ risks are
priced in a same way.
Chapter IV studies the comovements of resale prices of a particular type of used
durable goods using US resale price data over 13 years. Starting from a multi-level
dynamic factor model in state space presentation, we identify the comovements of
products within each functionality segment, across the entire industry, and within
each brand and OEM after the segment-level comovements are controlled for. We
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observe that, despite the heterogeneity in product models and brands, there are strong
comovements throughout the used goods market and within each segment—the latent
industry and segment factors are able to capture up to 81.4% of the variation of
a particular product’s price change. We also show that after the latent segment
factors are controlled for, products from the same manufacturer still exhibit strong
comovements, but not so much for products of the same brand. Finally, we observe
no material impact on the OEM and brand factors when a brand is terminated. A
big product recall, however, results in significant product price drops.
3
CHAPTER II
Pricing Demand Risks in Just-in-Time
Outsourcing
2.1 Introduction
An increasing number of original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) opt to out-
source production-related activities to contract manufacturers (CMs), resulting in
rapid growth in contract manufacturing business. The international contract elec-
tronics industry, for example, has experienced a 33.4% increase in revenue, reaching
$347.3 billion in 2010 (Dinges 2011). Boom in contract manufacturing also gives rise
to large CMs serving a number of OEMs around the globe. For instance, our col-
laborator, a Norwegian auto-parts CM, supplies bumper beams to 11 international
OEMs.
This paper is motivated by our collaborator’s just-in-time (JIT) contractual rela-
tionship with her OEM customers. The JIT contract is used quite often in contract
manufacturing in various industries such as automotive and electronics (Huggins and
Olsen 2003, Duenyas et al. 1997, Waters-Fuller 1996). It requires the CM to deliver
exactly the OEM’s orders at designated time and location. While inadequate delivery
is severely penalized, excess production is at the CM’s own cost. For the OEMs, the
benefits of the JIT outsourcing include reduced inventory costs and shorter produc-
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tion lead time (e.g., Ansari and Modarress 1990, Tracey et al. 1995). For the CMs,
however, researchers found that they may bear the production and inventory costs,
and demand risks transferred from the OEMs (Romero 1991, Fandel and Reese 1991,
Dong et al. 2001). Indeed, one major concern of the CMs is the unstable outsourcing
orders under the short response time allowed by the JIT contracts (Waters-Fuller
1996, González-Benito and Spring 2000). Some CMs would even quit the contractual
relationship when the demand becomes too volatile (Matson and Matson 2007).
Our collaborator, the Norwegian auto-parts supplier, is among the CMs who are
particularly concerned about the demand risks they have to bear in JIT outsourc-
ing. With its earnings concave in production capacity usage, the Norwegian CM is
reluctant to accept highly variable businesses as they could be more costly and less
profitable. Although measures are taken to offer certain protection against demand
fluctuations, for instance, setting thresholds on outsourcing orders such that, once
reached, unit bumper beam price will be renegotiated, our collaborator’s concerns
are not fully addressed. As a result, the Norwegian CM only chooses OEMs with
stable and predictable businesses.
High outsourcing demand variability itself, however, should not be a rejection
rule if the CM is able to pool demands from different OEMs together. Demand
pooling is made possible by the flexible production capacity, which is typical for CMs
supplying standard product components such as automobile parts and personal laptop
screens. In our collaborator’s case, for example, while different car models require
different bumper beams, they can all be produced using the same equipment with
minor module changes incurring negligible additional costs. With demand pooling,
the CM’s overall capacity usage for all her customers could be relatively stable even
when an individual OEM’s demand is volatile. In this case, the cost caused by
the OEM’s random orders is also small. Thus, contracting with such an OEM still
provides high profit margins even if the OEM places volatile orders and does not
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compensate the CM for the risk cost explicitly.
On the other hand, from the OEM’s perspective, JIT outsourcing is a perfect
tool to transfer the unwanted random demand to the CM, thus reducing the capacity
usage variability and consequently the production cost. However, not all demand
randomness needs to be eliminated, especially when the OEM has flexible production
capacity that allows demand pooling.
In this paper, we propose a model to price the CM’s cost of bearing the demand
risk and the OEM’s benefit of transferring it under flexible production capacity. We
show that, with demand pooling, the variability of the outsourcing business only
partly determines the risk cost/benefit. We distinguish between the capacity risk and
demand risk: the latter refers to the absolute variability of the outsourcing demand,
while the former refers to the variability that cannot be offset by other demands
utilizing the same production capacity. Under flexible capacity, only the capacity
risk matters, as all idiosyncratic demand risks are diversified away. Particularly, the
higher the capacity risk carried by the outsourcing demand, the more the outsourcing
benefits the OEM and costs the CM. One interesting case is an outsourcing demand
whose randomness can be completely offset by other sources. Such a demand carries
zero capacity risk and, thus, creates zero cost for the CM and zero benefit for the
OEM.
Based on the price of demand risks, we introduce a scale-free metric risk ratio to
measure the relative cost of demand risks with respect to the expected revenue of the
outsourcing business. For the CM, the higher the risk ratio, the more the CM’s gross
profit margin is eroded if the OEM does not compensate for the CM’s bearing of the
demand risk. For the OEM, the risk ratio measures the efficiency of outsourcing in
terms of shifting the demand risk costs. Given two potential outsourcing demands, the
one with the higher risk ratio creates more benefit for the OEM per unit outsourced.
In the empirical analysis, we apply our model to the Norwegian auto-parts CM
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supplying bumper beams to 11 OEMs. We report that none of the OEMs’ outsourcing
businesses carries demand risk that significantly erodes the CM’s profit margin. Our
empirical result is consistent with this intuition given the long-standing contractual
relationships between the CM and the OEMs in our data set.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews related work in literature.
Section 3 explains the model setup and Section 4 presents our pricing model. Section
5 applies the pricing model to a Norwegian auto-parts CM. Section 6 concludes.
2.2 Literature review
In this paper we propose a model to price the CM’s future capacity usage, and
then the demand risks under JIT contracts. Secomandi (2010) and Secomandi and
Wang (2012) study pricing of natural gas pipeline capacity under firm (guaranteed)
transport contracts. Under firm contracts, buyers of the pipeline capacity pay the
demand rate (reservation fee) to reserve the maximum quantity of capacity to use
and a commodity rate (execution fee) to use this capacity. Secomandi (2010) looks at
point-to-point transport contracts while Secomandi and Wang (2012) focus on net-
work contracts. In Secomandi (2010), Secomandi shows that under a linear earnings
function, the pipeline capacity price, i.e. the demand rate, perceived by the buyer
is equal to the price of a spread option on the natural gas futures prices at the de-
livery and receipt markets. Furthermore, he models the capacity value perceived by
the pipeline company to be the equilibrium price that maximizes the welfare of the
delivery and receipt markets. Proving that the equilibrium price coincides with the
spread option price, Secomandi tests his model by comparing the realized demand
rate with the prediction. In this paper, we study a problem where the randomness
in demand has important cost implications for both the CM and the OEM. Hence,
instead of taking an option perspective and pricing the right for future execution, we
directly price the CM’s cost of accepting and the OEM’s benefit of removing a random
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demand. This approach better matches the practitioners’ interests. Furthermore, in-
stead of focusing on the specific outsourcing business between the CM and the OEM,
we look at the entire business portfolios of both agents. We adopt concave earnings
function observed from the data set and price demand risks based on marginal utility
pricing theory. In the end, we test our model by applying it to a Norwegian CM and
report supportive result.
This paper studies the influence of correlated capacity usages on the price of
demand risks. Demand correlation and risk pooling have been widely examined in
the operations management literature. In supply chain coordination, Van Mieghem
(1999) illustrates the influences of demand variability and correlation on the OEM’s
investment in a game-theoretic model. While Van Mieghem suggests that demand
pooling may also affect the supplier, he does not analyze this issue further. In the area
of capacity management, Van Mieghem (1998, 2007b, 2003) explore how to mitigate
the mismatch between supply and demand via effective capacity management when
the decision maker faces correlated demands. Chod and Rudi (2005) extend the model
by allowing the decision maker to influence the demand via product pricing. Apart
from reducing demand and supply mismatches, several studies have also considered
the role of demand correlation and risk pooling in managing financial risks created
by demand uncertainties. Gaur and Seshadri (2005) consider a risk-averse producer
hedging financial risks with a market instrument whose price is correlated with the
product demand. Zhou and Rudi (2010) examine the pricing of an over-the-counter
financial contract designed to hedge risks in product markets. Chod et al. (2010)
study the relationship between operation flexibility and financial hedging using an
instrument whose payoff is negatively correlated with the demand. They report that
operation and financial hedging can be complements or substitutes to each other
depending on the demand correlation. Our work assumes that there is no mismatch
between supply and demand: The OEM can always satisfy the demand, either by
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producing in-house or outsourcing under a JIT contract. But via outsourcing, the
OEM further benefits from the reduced overall capacity usage variability. We quantify
this benefit and examine its dependence on capacity usage correlation.
Another main element of our model is demand risk reallocation in the supply
chain. Under a JIT contract, the OEM effectively transfers his demand risks to
the CM. Ülkü et al. (2007) examine whether the OEM or the CM should bear the
financial risk imposed by demand variation to achieve maximum supply chain profit in
a situation where the CM serves several OEMs with independent businesses. Cachon
(2004) studies the inventory risk allocation between a retailer and a supplier using
wholesale price contracts. In this paper, we evaluate the transfered demand risks
from the OEM and the CM’s own perspectives, rather than from the viewpoint of the
entire supply chain.
Component outsourcing has also been studied in different situations. Grahovac
and Parker (2003) show that OEMs outsource components of high degree of modu-
larity to avoid over-investments even if the CM does not have any economy of scale.
Mikkola (2003) reports that component outsourcing cultivates closer cooperation be-
tween suppliers and OEMs and this way raises innovation in future product design.
2.3 Model setup
Consider a component that is a standard part of a variety of products made by
different OEMs, e.g., personal computer monitors, car bumper beams. This compo-
nent can be customized to fit different products by simple changes of modules in a
standard manufacturing procedure. Therefore, it uses flexible production resources.
An OEM (he) makes a range of products containing this component. Hence, the
OEM can take advantage of the production flexibility and pool the market demand of
different products together. With in-house production capacity installed, the OEM
considers outsourcing part of the total demand to a CM via a JIT contract. The
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CM (she) under consideration already supplies this component to a number of OEMs
under JIT contracts when the new customer approaches. Thus, she also has flexible
production capacity and can pool demand from different OEMs together.
We consider the case of JIT outsourcing where the OEM orders random number
of product components at pre-determined time points over the contract horizon.1
Whenever an order is released, the CM is required to fulfill it within a period shorter
than the production lead time. Therefore, for the OEM, JIT outsourcing benefits
him by replacing random in-house production capacity usage with risk-free deliveries.
For the CM, while contracting with the new OEM brings in more business, it might
also lead to more volatile usage of her production capacity. This is particularly true
when the CM keeps little inventory of the component possibly for cost reduction
purposes. Indeed, according to our collaborator who supplies bumper beams to a
number of OEMs, “The bumper beams are directly loaded to the delivery trucks
from the production line.”
Our goal is to quantify the OEM’s benefits and CM’s costs resulted from the
transfer of the uncertain demand, or equivalently, stochastic capacity usage, under JIT
outsourcing. To start, we make the following assumptions on the outsourcing process:
(i) The OEM places stochastic orders Qi at fixed time points {Ti} (i = 1, 2, . . . , N)
with T0 = 0; (ii) the OEM’s orders are met immediately; and (iii) the CM keeps no
inventory. Consequently, the deliveries/orders at different time points are not related.
This allows us to view the JIT contract as a collection of independent subcontracts
that become effective in a consecutive manner. In particular, subcontract i comes
into effect at time Ti−1 and expires at time Ti. At its expiration Ti, the OEM places
the order Qi and the CM immediately delivers it.
As the OEM’s orders Qi (i = 1, 2, . . . , N) are contingent on the exogenous market
demand, it can be modeled as a stochastic process that takes nonnegative values over
1This is the JIT arrangement between our collaborator and her OEM customers.
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the service horizon. At the expiration of subcontract i, both the OEM and the CM
observe the latest demand Qi and update their information on the stochastic demand
process, as well as the prediction of the next outsourcing order Qi+1. Therefore, at any
point in time, the demand risk faced by the CM and shrugged off by the OEM is only
the uncertainty of the next outsourcing demand. In other words, the benefit/cost
of the transfer of stochastic demand in JIT outsourcing primarily depends on the
its benefit/cost over each of the N independent subcontracts. Hence, we start by
studying the demand risk over one subcontract.
Consider a subcontract and assume that it starts at time 0 and ends at time T
without loss of generality. Denote the outsourcing demand at T by QT , with Q0 = q.
Based on the discussion above, we model QT as the terminal value of a nonnegative
stochastic process Qt (t ∈ [0, T ]) dependent on the OEM’s total market demand. Let
MT denote the rest of the OEM’s market demand that is satisfied in-house at T . We
model MT as the terminal value of a nonnegative stochastic process Mt (t ∈ [0, T ])
with M0 = m. We assume that MT is significantly greater than QT , indicating that
the OEM usually outsources a relatively small portion of the total demand.
Before contracting with the new OEM, the CM already supplies the component to
several other OEM customers under JIT contracts. Let ST be the CM’s total demand
at T without the new outsourcing business, with S0 = s. ST is the terminal value
of a nonnegative stochastic process St (t ∈ [0, T ]). We assume ST to be significantly
greater than QT to capture the fact that the CM usually operates on a large business
scale.
We use the quantities QT , ST and MT to measure the units of production capacity
used by these demand, because satisfying each unit of the demand requires a fixed
amount of production resources such as material, manufacturing time, and labor. For
the same reason, we use the terms “demand” and “capacity usage” interchangeably,
and call ST and MT as the original capacity usage in the following analysis. We
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assume that QT , ST and MT all have continuous marginal distributions. Although
the product is in discrete unit, the actual orders and capacity usage are usually in
tens or hundreds of thousands. In addition, the contracts usually do not require the
OEM to release his order in batches. Therefore, the continuous approximation is
reasonable and convenient for analysis.
The outsourcing demand process Qt (t ∈ [0, T ]) is public information. This cor-
responds to the fact that the OEM usually grants the CM access to his demand
database so as to make better production plans (Cachon and Fisher 2000, Li and Lin
2006); this is also the case with our collaborator in the auto-parts industry. Mt and
St are private information to the OEM and the CM, respectively.
Assume that the CM and the OEM are profit maximizers. We learn from our data
set that the CM’s earnings are concave increasing in the outsourcing demand. The
OEM is likely to use the same manufacturing equipments and follow the same proce-
dure in his in-house production. Thus it is reasonable to postulate that his earnings
are concave increasing in the market demand as well. Let a concave increasing func-
tion U(·) be their instantaneous earnings on the demand, or equivalently, capacity
usage, at time T . The more concave U(·) is, the lower tolerance the OEM/CM has
for capacity variability as less expected earnings can be obtained. Hence, we can in-
terpret the concavity of the earnings as the OEM/CM’s risk aversion parameter. U(·)
is continuously differentiable on the nonnegative real line, since the capacity usage is
never negative.
2.4 Demand risk pricing
In this section, we price the demand risks in JIT outsourcing from both the OEM
and the CM’s perspectives. We start by considering the demand risks over the sub-
contract on [0, T ]. Then we price the demand risks over the entire service horizon
using results from a single subcontract.
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For ease of exposition, we use Z ∈ {S,M} to denote either the CM (Z = S) or the
OEM (Z = M) in the rest of the paper. When studying the subcontract on [0, T ], to
make explicit the dependence of QT and ZT on their initial values, q and z, we write
them as QqT and Z
z
T , respectively.
2.4.1 Demand risks over a subcontract
Consider the subcontract on [0, T ]. The OEM and CM observe the latest demand
q at time 0 and plan the production for the next demand that will be realized at T .
Thus, they face inter-temporal demand risks over [0, T ]. In the following, we first find
the “present value” of the future outsourcing demand, or equivalently, production
capacity usage, accounting for the inter-temporal demand risks. Then using this
present value, we price the demand risks under the subcontract.
2.4.1.1 Present value of future production capacity
Our primary goal is to quantify the inter-temporal demand risks under flexible pro-
duction capacity which enables demand pooling. This greatly resembles the standard
pricing problem in finance, which prices the inter-temporal uncertainties of assets’ fu-
ture payoffs in a variety of contexts (see Cochrane 2005 for an introduction to different
asset pricing models). Therefore, we resort to standard financial models, particularly
the marginal utility pricing theory (e.g., Davis 1998, 2001, Karatzas 1997, Staum
2008), and define the present value of the future outsourcing demand as follows.
Definition II.1. The present value of the outsourcing demand, QqT , is the certainty
equivalent quantity (CEQ) at which, at time 0, the OEM/CM is indifferent between
remaining in the original business, ZzT (z ∈ {s,m}), and substituting a small amount
of his/her original business for the outsourcing demand. More precisely, let CEQ(QqT )
13























T ) are all in product units (e.g.,
number of bumper beams). Note that although the product unit is discrete, the actual
orders and capacity usage are usually in large quantities, allowing us to approximate
a few units as the infinitesimal amount δ in (2.1).
Theorem II.2. Define V (z) ≡ E[U(ZzT )], where z ∈ {s,m} is the initial capacity
usage of the CM/OEM at time 0. If V (z) is continuous and differentiable, the present













Proof. By Definition II.1, CEQ satisfies equation (2.1). Taylor expansion around



















QqT + o(δ), (2.3)
where U ′(x) ≡ dU(x)
dx















QqT + o(δ). (2.4)
V (z) is continuous and differentiable with respect to z. Therefore, by equation (2.1),
we have










This proves the theorem. 
Intuitively, when T = 0, CEQz(Q
q
0) = q. That is, the present value of the observed
outsourcing demand q is still q, as no uncertainty is involved.












where f ′(x) = df(x)/dx. We further rewrite cov(U ′(ZzT ), Q
z
T ) in (2.6) schematically
as ρuσqσu, where ρu is the correlation between the outsourcing demand, Q
q
T , and the
OEM/CM’s marginal utility at the original capacity usage, U ′(ZzT ). σq and σu are
the standard deviations of QqT and U









Equation (2.7) suggests that the variability of the outsourcing demand influences
the present value via the term ρuσqσu. As σu pertains to the OEM/CM’s utility
and original capacity usage, it is fixed. Hence, the dependence of CEQz(Q
q
T ) on the
demand risk is primarily determined by the correlation coefficient ρu. This means
that the common impression that, the more variable QqT , the more risky the demand,
and thus the lower its present value, is not true. Indeed, we will show that, under
general modeling assumptions, the sign of ρu in (2.7) is the opposite of the correlation
between the outsourcing demand and the OEM/CM’s original capacity usage. This
yields an intuitive dependence of CEQz(Q
q
T ) on σq that nicely resembles the standard
results in risk diversification.
Assumption II.3. Assume that the outsourcing demand, QqT , and the CM/OEM’s
original capacity usage, ZzT (Z ∈ {S,M}), are random variables with log-normal
distributions.
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We note that Assumption II.3 is indeed the commonly-used modeling assumption
in analysis of nonnegative stochastic processes, thus does not limit the applicability
of our model and result in practice. Section 5 gives an example of modeling St and
Qt as processes with log-normal marginal distributions from real data.
Lemma II.4. Let sgn(·) be the sign function that equals 1 if the argument is positive,
-1 if negative, and 0 if zero. Under Assumption II.3 and a concave increasing earnings
function that is continuously differentiable, we have
sgn(ρu) = −sgn(ρ),
where ρ ≡ corr(QqT , ZzT ).










Then Q∗ and Z∗ are standard normal random variables. Let ρ̃ = corr(Q∗, Z∗). We
have
Q∗ = ρ̃Z∗ +
√
1− ρ̃2Z̃∗,









Let W ≡ eZ∗ , W̃ ≡ eZ̃∗ for ease of exposition. W is independent of W̃ . Then
cov(U ′(ZzT ), Q
q












Because W are W̃ are independent, the equality above reduces to
cov(U ′(ZzT ), Q
q








eµq E W̃ δq
√
1−ρ̃2 .





















U ′(X), X ρ̃δq/δz
))
. (2.8)
Let F (x) be the cumulative distribution function of X. By Cuadras (2002),
cov
(













Because F (x) ∈ [0, 1], the integrand is nonnegative on the real line. Recall the the




U ′(X), X ρ̃δq/δz
)
> 0 if ρ̃ < 0,
cov
(
U ′(X), X ρ̃δq/δz
)
< 0 if ρ̃ > 0.
Furthermore, when ρ = 0, QT and ZT are independent and, thus, ρu = 0. Therefore,
sgn(ρu) = −sgn(ρ̃).
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Next we relate the sign of ρ̃ to the sign of ρ = corr(QqT , Z
z
T ). By definition,
sgn (cov(QqT , Z
z









Furthermore, we know that for the two random variables Q∗ and Z∗, their covariances




[H(q∗, z∗)− F (q∗)G(z∗)] dq∗dz∗, (2.10)
where H(·, ·) is the joint distribution, and F (·) and G(·) are marginal distributions
of Q∗ and Z∗.




[H(q∗, z∗)− F (q∗)G(z∗)] df(q∗)dg(z∗). (2.11)




are positive. Therefore, by (2.9–
2.11), we have
sgn(ρ) = sgn(ρ̃) = −sgn(ρu).

Lemma II.4 and (2.7) indicate that, due to the risk pooling effect, only demand
that is correlated with the contracting party’s capacity usage is discounted in the
present value. To distinguish this correlated demand variability from the absolute
demand variability, we call the former the capacity risk of the outsourcing demand.
Then Lemma II.4 states that, all else being equal, the present value of future out-
sourcing demand QqT decreases in its capacity risk. Specifically we see that:
• When the outsourcing demand is positively (negatively) correlated with either
contracting party’s original capacity usage ZzT , the more variable it is, the lower
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(higher) its present value. This agrees with the standard results from financial
pricing models. Intuitively, a positively correlated QqT magnifies the party’s
overall capacity usage fluctuations when added to the portfolio, and, thus, car-
ries positive capacity risk. So it should have a low present value. Similarly, a
negatively correlated QqT offsets the original fluctuations (note that Q
q
T  ZzT
by construction), and, thus, carries negative capacity risk. So it should have a
high present value.










That is, the present value of a random but independent QqT is identical to
that of a deterministic demand stable at EQqT , as both of them carry zero
capacity risk. This demonstrates the perfect risk diversification effect. When
the outsourcing demand is independent of the CM/OEM’s original capacity
usage, its uncertainties are completely idiosyncratic and, thus, can be diversified
away by other demands using the same production resources.
2.4.1.2 Price of demand risks under the subcontract
We price the demand risk, or more explicitly, the capacity risk, over [0, T ] by
comparing the present values of the following two outsourcing orders.
Order (i): Observed to be q at time 0. Observed to be QqT at time 0+, immediately
after the subcontract becomes effective at time 0. Remains at QqT throughout
(0, T ].
Order (ii): Observed to be q at time 0. Observed to be QqT at time T .
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Clearly orders (i) and (ii) differ only in the way the inter-temporal uncertainty is
resolved. Thus, the difference in their present values is the price of the demand risk
at time 0.
For order (i), the outsourcing demand first jumps from q to QqT in an infinitesimal
amount of time, then remains deterministic over (0, T ]. During the demand jump
from time 0 to 0+, the CM/OEM’s original capacity usage remains constant at z
by continuity. Thus, the outsourcing demand and the original capacity usage are
independent at 0+. Over (0, T ], the outsourcing demand is fixed at the observed value
QqT and the capacity usage changes. Hence, the outsourcing demand is independent
from the capacity usage at T as well. Therefore, order (i) is independent of the
capacity usage on [0, T ]. Let CEQcz denote the present value of order (i). By Theorem
II.2, we have
CEQcz =





Order (ii) corresponds to the actual outsourcing demand. By Theorem II.2, the
present value of order (ii) is CEQz(Q
q
T ).
The difference between CEQz(EQqT ) and CEQz(Q
q
T ) is then the price of the de-
mand risk at time 0. For simplicity we ignore the argument of CEQ in the rest of the
paper. Formally we define the following:
Definition II.5. The price of the inter-temporal uncertainties carried by the out-
sourcing demand, QqT , is
Pz = CEQ
c
z − CEQz, (2.14)
where CEQcz (z ∈ {s,m}) is defined in (2.13).
Recall that all else being equal, the more capacity risk the outsourcing demand
carries, the lower its present value. Therefore,
• Pz > 0 if and only if QqT carries positive capacity risk, i.e., is positively correlated
with ZsT . In other words, adding Q
q
T to the production capacity deteriorates the
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original risk exposure of either contracting party. For the OEM, this means that,
if produced in-house, QqT increases his original capacity usage variability and,
thus, is better outsourced. Pm is the OEM’s gain by replacing the stochastic
in-house production with a risk-free delivery. Hence, Pm is the fair price for the
risk from the OEM’s perspective in the sense that, it is the highest amount the
OEM is willing to pay for the benefits of the risk-free delivery. For the CM,
Ps > 0 means that taking on the outsourcing business has an adverse impact
on her original risk exposure, and Ps is the cost caused by such an increase in
capacity usage variability. Consequently, Ps is the fair price for the risk from
the CM’s perspective in the sense that, it is the lowest compensation amount
at which the CM is willing to enter the outsourcing business.
• Pz < 0 if and only if QqT carries negative capacity risk. Put another way,
incorporating QqT to the portfolio mitigates the fluctuations in either contracting
party’s capacity usage. Specifically, producing QqT in-house reduces the OEM’s
original capacity usage variability. As a result, the OEM will not outsource
unless being offered at least −Pm product units at time 0 for foregoing the risk-
mitigation benefits of producing QqT . On the other hand, the CM is willing to
pay at most −Ps to the OEM for the benefits of decreased capacity variability
by adding QqT to her production portfolio.
• Pz = 0 if and only if QqT carries no capacity risk. Such an outsourcing demand
is constant or is random but independent of ZzT . That is, it exerts neither
positive nor negative influence on the original capacity usage variability of the
OEM/CM.
Note that by Theorem II.2, when QqT carries nonzero capacity risk, the CM and
the OEM price the demand risks based on their original capacity usage, and perceive
different cost Ps and benefit Pm of outsourcing. When Q
q
T carries no capacity risk,
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however, both the OEM and the CM conclude Pm = Ps = 0, regardless of their
original capacity usage, MmT and S
s
T .
While the risk price Pz is an intuitive measure for demand risks, its magnitude is
not very informative for cost/benefit assessment when reported alone. This is because
Pz’s magnitude depends on the scale of the outsourcing demand. Indeed, by (2.7)
and (2.12), a large Pz may not be a concern at all if the outsourcing demand is
constantly high. Similarly, a small Pz does not necessarily indicate low risk business,
especially when demand is always low. In addition, when evaluating the cost/benefit
of the outsourcing business in practice, it is often useful to compare the cost/benefit
of demand risks with the outsourcing revenue. Hence, we define risk ratio to be the
normalized price of demand risks as the following.
Definition II.6. The risk ratio, πz (z ∈ {s,m}), of the outsourcing demand, QqT ,
from either contracting party’s perspective, is the relative risk price with respect to





In essence, the risk ratio measures the variability level of the outsourcing demand,
and is thus similar to the commonly-used coefficient of variation, cv. cv is defined as
cv ≡ σ/µ, where µ and σ are the mean and standard deviation of the random variable
under consideration. In some sense, the risk ratio may be viewed as an extension of
the coefficient of variation in a dynamic setting. However, we note that one important
distinction between πz and cv is that the former accounts for the risk pooling effects.
The risk ratio, πs, is a particularly relevant measure for the CM. It gives the
cost of the demand risk relative to the expected outsourcing business. The higher
the risk ratio, the more the CM’s profit margin will be eroded if the OEM does not
compensate for the demand risks she bears. Thus, the more the CM should worry
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about the capacity risk.
For the OEM, the risk ratio, πm, represents the benefit achieved via outsourc-
ing relative to the scale of the outsourcing business. It measures the efficiency of
outsourcing in terms of risk cost reduction in the sense that, given two potential
outsourcing demands, the one with the higher risk ratio generates more benefits per
unit outsourced. πm can be used to select the part of the total market demand that
will be outsourced when there exist factors that restrict the OEM from unlimited
outsourcing. These factors include, for example, the OEM’s concerns on the quality
of the CM’s products and political risks in a global supply chain.
2.4.2 Pricing demand risks over the entire outsourcing horizon
Having studied the demand risks transferred under a single subcontract, we are
now ready to price the demand risks over the entire outsourcing horizon. Recall that
the OEM places orders Qi at fixed time points {Ti} (i = 1, 2, . . . , N) with T0 = 0.
Then the JIT contract can be viewed as a collection of independent subcontracts.
Subcontract i comes into effect at time Ti−1 and expires at Ti, at which the outsourcing
demand Qi is observed and satisfied.
By Definitions II.5 and II.6, the price of demand risks over subcontract i is contin-
gent on the outsourcing demand observed at the starting time Ti−1. To make explicit
the dependence of Qi (resp. Zi) on its earlier realization Qi−1 (resp. Zi−1), we write
it as Qi−1i (resp. Z
i−1
i ). Let CEQ
i
z be the present value of demand Q
i−1
i evaluated




z denote the price and risk ratio computed given the
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where Ei−1[·] is the expectation conditional on the information up to time Ti−1.
At time 0, the risk ratios of all future subcontracts (i > 0) are random and contin-
gent on future demands. An intuitive measure of the demand risks transferred over
the entire service horizon is the average of the expected risk ratios of this subcontract
portfolio. More explicitly, we define the following:








2.5 Empirical study on an auto-parts CM
In this section we apply our pricing model developed in Section 2.4 to a Norwegian
auto-part CM who supplies bumper beams to 11 OEM customers under JIT contracts.
Due to the large order quantities and short time window between order placement
and delivery, the CM is granted access to the OEMs’ demand databases for better
production planning. The OEMs’ orders are released on regular basis most of the
time, usually in weeks. Hence, we can model the JIT contract as a collection of
independent subcontracts, each of which spans over one week.
In the following, we first estimate the model parameters from the data set. Then
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we study the cost of the demand risk from the CM’s perspective. This way we examine
whether the CM incurs significant costs due to uncertain demand when accepting the
JIT contracts.
2.5.1 Model calibration
Our data set consists of the CM’s daily production volume and monthly earn-
ings from January 2003 to August 2008 for each of the 11 OEMs. Different OEMs
started their outsourcing at different dates, but none of them stopped the outsourc-
ing business over the observation period. The newest customer came in 2006, while
6 OEMs established the relationship prior to Jan. 2003. These observations imply
that outsourcing is a profitable practice for the CM and OEMs alike.
According to our collaborator, it keeps almost zero inventory. Therefore, we can
use the CM’s weekly production volume to approximate each OEM’s orders. Let Qit
represent OEM i’s outsourcing demand in week t (i = 1, 2, . . . , 11; t = 1, 2, . . .)2. We
assume that the OEM places the order Qit at the end of week t and the CM produces
and delivers Qit instantaneously. Use S
i
t to denote the CM’s original capacity usage
without OEM i’s business Qit. Because total orders from all 11 OEMs constitute about
98% of the CM’s overall bumper beam manufacturing business, we approximate Sit
by the sum of all the other OEMs’ orders Qjt (j 6= i).
We find that all log(Qit) and log(S
i
t) can be adequately modeled as time series with
a constant mean and drift plus integrated MA(1,1) white noise processes (t = 1, 2, . . .;
i = 1, 2, . . . , 11):




























2As we have multiple OEMs in the empirical study, our notation is slightly different from those
in Section 2.4.
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t , respectively. ∆Xt ≡ Xt − Xt−1,
eit ∼ N(0, σ2i ), ait ∼ N(0, δ2i ).
Table 2.1: Model parameters.
(logqi, µ
i
q), and (logsi, µ
i





respectively. θi and φi are the MA coefficients of the integrated MA(1,1) white noise process
driving logQit and logS
i
t , respectively. σi and δi are the standard deviations of the normal
innovations in the IMA(1,1) processes of logQit and logS
i
t , respectively. ρi is the correlation








q θi σi logsi µ
i
s φi δi ρ
i
1 9.3 -0.004 -0.91 0.78 11.0 -0.02 -0.79 0.48 0.27
2 9.8 -0.007 -0.94 0.58 10.8 -0.0007 -0.85 0.56 0.48
3 9.1 0.03 -0.80 0.68 11.3 -0.01 -0.83 0.43 0.52
4 7.8 0.01 -0.81 1.00 11.2 -0.001 -0.88 0.34 0
5 8.0 0.01 -0.84 0.84 11.3 0.02 -0.55 0.31 0
6 9.7 0.007 -0.95 0.59 11.0 0.0004 -0.97 0.42 0.31
7 7.7 -0.22 -0.76 0.79 11.2 0.02 -0.56 0.33 0
8 8.5 -0.05 -0.70 0.96 11.4 -0.01 -0.4 0.22 0
9 7.8 0.06 -0.67 0.93 11.3 0.01 -0.70 0.28 0
10 8.7 -0.002 -0.996 0.69 11.2 -0.003 -0.86 0.38 0.17
11 8.6 -0.0006 -0.993 0.77 11.1 -0.006 -0.86 0.44 0
Table 2.1 shows parameter estimates for (2.21) from the data. We observe that the
outsourcing quantities are highly volatile compared to CM’s corresponding capacity
usage processes. Furthermore, given the variances of innovations eit and a
i
t (i =
1, 2, . . . , 11), the drift coefficients µi are not significantly different from zero. In fact,
close-to-zero drift is expected considering that our time unit is in weeks. Otherwise,
over the observation period of 296 weeks, Qit and S
i
t processes would on average
increase or decrease exponentially, which is not observed. Lastly, when estimating ρi,
we set the estimates that are not significantly different from zero on a 5% confidence
level to 0. The ρi values in Table 2.1 indicate that outsourcing demand processes
have nonnegative levels of association with corresponding capacity usages. This is
consistent with the fact that all OEMs are in the same industry and facing similar
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market demand.
We assume that the CM has the following earnings function
U(St) =
 log(St) if α = 1A
1−α(St)
1−α if α ∈ [0, 1),
(2.22)
Parameter α indicates the concavity of the CM’s earnings. The higher α is, the
lower tolerance the CM has for capacity variability as less earnings can be obtained.
Hence, we can view α as the risk-aversion indicator, with α = 0 corresponding to
risk-neutrality. The point estimate for α is 0.5, with estimation error 0.2.
2.5.2 Demand risk of the outsourcing business
We now apply the models developed in Section 2.4 to price the demand risks
carried by the 11 OEMs’ outsourcing businesses. For ease of exposition, we ignore
the subscript s in e.g., CEQs, since all the data is from the CM and, consequently,
the risk prices are from the CM’s perspective.
As in Section 2.4, we first find the present value of a random demand QqT over a
subcontract on [0, T ].
Lemma II.8. If the CM’s earnings function takes the form (2.22), and her original
capacity usage Sst and the outsourcing demand Q
q
t (t ∈ [0, T ]) have the following
dynamics
d logYt = µ(t, Gt)dt+ σ(t, Gt)dWt, Y0 = y, (2.23)
where Gt is any random or deterministic process that is functionally independent of Yt
and adapted to Wt. Wt can be a multi-dimensional Wiener process. Then the present








Proof. By (2.23), we have














if α = 1
(As)1−α
1−α E [h(Gt,Wt, t)] if α ∈ [0, 1)
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if α = 1
s−αA1−α E[h(Gt,Wt, t)] = 1s E [(AS
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Clearly Qit and S
i
t (i = 1, 2, . . . , 11; t = 1, 2, . . .) in (2.21) satisfy the dynamics
in (2.23). Let πit−1 denote the risk ratio of the outsourcing demand Q
i
t evaluated at
the end of week t − 1 (t = 1, 2, . . . ; i = 1, 2, . . . , 11). By (2.21) and Lemma II.8,












where βi ≡ ρiσi/δi is the sensitivity of the outsourcing demand’s driving white noise
process to the white noise process of the CM’s original capacity usage. ait−1 is the
white noise of Sit at the end of week t−1. Recall that ait−1 is sampled from zero-mean
normal distribution with variance δ2i . Therefore, the risk ratios of the OEM i’s orders
are iid log-normal random variables over the contract horizon when evaluated at time
0.
Let Πi be the normalized price of the demand risks carried by OEM i’s outsourcing
business (i = 1, 2, . . . , 11). By Definition II.7,









i . We note that when φi = 0, this corresponds to
the simple case where Sit is approximated as a geometric Brownian motion (GBM).
In other words, the auto-regressive parts of ∆ logSit ’s white noise process increases









From (2.25) and (2.26), the signs of both πit−1 and Πi (t = 1, 2, . . . , i = 1, 2, . . . , 11)




. Particularly, we observe that:
• As expected, the risk ratio is positive if and only if the outsourcing demand is
positively correlated with the CM’s original capacity usage (βi > 0), i.e., carries
positive capacity risk. In this case, the CM’s original risk is increased by the
outsourcing business and, thus, incurs a positive risk cost. The risk ratio is zero
if and only if the outsourcing demand is not correlated with the CM’s capacity
(βi = 0).
• The price of demand risks increases with the correlation ρi between the inno-






t . This result is intuitive because given the
absolute demand variability σi, we expect the capacity risk to increase with the
correlation coefficient, and consequently the risk price to increase as well.
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• All else being equal, the more risk-averse the CM, the higher the risk ratio of
the outsourcing demand. The risk-aversion parameter, α, reflects how much
the CM weighs the capacity risk. For a risk-neutral CM (α = 0), (2.25) and
(2.26) give πit−1 = 0 and Πi = 0, i.e., no risk price is expected, regardless of the
capacity risk of the outsourcing demand.
Table 2.2 shows the CM’s average risk ratios with 11 OEMs. Compare the risk
ratios with the absolute variability, σi, of OEM i’s business (i = 1, 2, . . .) in Table 2.1,
we see that OEMs with high risk ratios are actually the ones with relatively low σ.
This indicates that making outsourcing decisions based on the demand risks might
be misleading at times.
Table 2.2: Risk ratios of outsourcing
Πi is the expected risk ratio of OEM i’s outsourcing demand from the CM’s perspective, i =
1, 2, . . . , 11.
OEM 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Π (%) 5.4 8.4 7.9 0 0 4.1 0 0 0 2.3 0
Because the Norwegian CM produces many other products besides bumper beams,
its overall gross profit margin is not an informative metric to assess the cost of de-
mand risks. We use Delphi’s gross profit margin, 18.14%, to approximate that of
our collaborator’s JIT outsourcing business. We test the risk ratios computed from
our model by comparing them to 18.14%. We observe that the risk ratios from all
11 OEMs are moderate, indicating that the CM is not assuming significant demand
risks without being compensated. This is consistent with our expectation given the
CM’s long-standing healthy contractual relationship with the OEMs.
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2.6 Concluding remarks
At the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to price demand risks
in component outsourcing in JIT literature. Both the OEM and the CM have flexible
production capacities and concave earnings on their capacity usage, and are profit
maximizers. We show that when the outsourcing demand is positively correlated
with the agent’s existing business, the higher risk it carries, the more the outsourcing
costs the CM and benefits the OEM. Furthermore, we introduce a scale-free quantity
risk ratio to measure the “riskiness” of the outsourcing business, accounting for the
demand pooling effect under flexible capacity. For the CM, the risk ratio gives the
cost of the demand risk relative to the expected outsourcing business. The higher the
risk ratio, the more the CM’s profit margin will be eroded if the OEM’s payment is
primarily based on the realized demand. Finally, we apply our model to a data set of
a Norwegian auto-parts CM serving 11 OEMs. We report that the CM’s risk ratios
of these outsourcing businesses are small. This agrees with our expectation given the
CM’s healthy business and prudence in selecting customers.
This study can be extended in many ways. One interesting direction to pursue
is incorporating the outsourcing demand as OEM’s decision variable depending on
its in-house production capacity, inventory level, etc. This will lead to an optimiza-
tion problem with the decision being the optimal capacity/inventory from the risk
perspective. Another interesting direction is extending the model to scenarios where
the OEM’s order arrives randomly over the contract horizon. Intuition has that price
of demand risks becomes higher as there are now two sources of randomness: the
uncertainty in demand quantities and the uncertainty of the order placement.
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CHAPTER III
Empirical Study on Managed Print Services
Pricing
3.1 Introduction
Increasingly, companies and institutions are outsourcing the management of their
information technology (IT) infrastructure to reduce cost and improve operations,
giving rise to the so-called managed services industry. Broadly defined, managed
services is the management provided by a third-party contractor, that is, the managed
services provider, over the institutional customer’s infrastructural IT operations such
as printing, network security, and data center monitoring. The trend of adopting
managed services is sweeping all sectors of the economy from manufacturing, banking,
to education and health care. In a recent survey on 400 US professionals (CompTIA
2011), 62% responded that their businesses plan to increase the spending on managed
services over the next two years. Answering to this demand, numerous managed
services providers emerge, and more and more traditional manufacturers expand their
existing operations to this new arena (Jacob and Ulaga 2008, Oliva and Kallenberg
2003, Salonen 2011, Cohen et al. 2006). One of the biggest challenges confronting the
practitioners is how to price these services. Indeed, according to a recent research
report (Walsh 2011), managed services providers are watching their profit margins
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“erode precipitously” due to “poor pricing practices” and intense competition.
Pricing in managed services is complicated by the unique features that distinguish
it from services to individual consumers. First, managed services are infrastructural in
nature. That is, the operations covered under managed services are mainly supportive
and might be viewed as utilities by the customer. Therefore, the customer’s service
demand is less sensitive to the service prices than service demand from individual
consumers. Second, for a majority types of managed services, service contracts are
customized rather than being a standard menu as in individual consumer services.
Contract customization arises because the managed services customers are enterprises
with different IT environment and service level requirements. Indeed, the fact that
the contracts are customized and flexible to meet different needs is emphasized by
managed services providers.
In this paper we study in-depth a particular type of managed services—the man-
aged print services (MPS). The goal of our study is to understand the contractual
interactions between the MPS provider and the institutional customers in practice.
This understanding, in turn, provides insights into pricing of general managed ser-
vices.
MPS provides comprehensive management of the institutional customer’s printer
fleet and covers supplies and maintenance for a monthly fee. Most MPS customers
(e.g., universities, banks, manufacturers) are not in the professional printing industry
and, thus, MPS is an infrastructural service unrelated to their core operations. Just
like other managed services, MPS has been growing explosively over the recent years.
Photizo (2011) estimates MPS global market to be $30 billion in 2011 and forecasts
a double-digit annual growth rate for the following 5 years. There are a number of
providers competing in the MPS market, including Xerox, HP, Ricoh and Lexmark.
We consider an MPS provider (he) serving a number of institutional customers.
The provider faces the fundamental problem of managing revenue and costs from his
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entire MPS portfolio (from multiple customers), when bidding for the business of a
new customer (she) among other service providers. Because a customer usually owns
hundreds or even thousands of printers with heterogeneous models, work loads and
costs, each provider negotiates service contracts with the customer. In this case, the
provider needs to design service contracts that achieve two goals: to win the bid, and
to optimize his own objective function. The MPS contracts under consideration are a
more complex variant of the three-part contracts commonly studied in marketing and
operations management literature (Wilson 1997, Iyengar et al. 2008, Sundararajan
2004). A standard three-part contract consists of a fixed price, a variable price and
a free-usage allowance. MPS contracts feature five parameters for each printer: the
fixed price, the variable prices per black & white (BW) and color print, and the free-
usage allowances for BW and color prints. In practice, the contract terms are decided
before the service starts and remain unchanged over the service horizon or until a
renegotiation takes place. Different printers may share the same contract terms. We
observe in practice that while the fixed price and allowances could be zero if the
customer so prefers, the variable prices are always positive.
To understand the contractual interactions between the provider and the institu-
tional customers, we develop two models. First, we propose a model of how much a
customer would pay for the service; or equivalently, the customer’s service valuation
(hereafter, the “customer’s pricing model”). Predictions from this model yield the
maximum amount the provider, whose data we use, can charge, and can be interpreted
as the provider’s winning bids that are acceptable to the customer. We discover the
following. (i) The customer’s service demand, that is, the print volume, is inelastic
in the service prices over the observed range. We believe this result arises from the
infrastructural nature of printing and anticipate it to apply to other types of managed
services as well. Under inelastic demand, we do not observe moral hazard type behav-
ior where lower prices result in higher print volumes (Laffont and Martimort 2001).
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(ii) An arbitrary customer’s payment for the service of a particular printer is the sum
of two parts: the payment of a “representative” customer, that is, the population
service valuation, and a random amount attributed to unobserved customer-specific
characteristics. This customer’s pricing model adequately characterizes (in-sample
R2 = 92%) and reliably forecasts (out-of-sample R2 = 65%) the observed customers’
payments, yielding the set of provider’s bids that are acceptable to the customer.
Specifically, the high explanatory power of the out-of-sample predictions indicates
that the unobserved customer-specific characteristics (e.g., negotiation peculiarities,
geographic locations) have weak influences on the customer’s payment. That is, the
population valuation dominates an individual institutional customer’s service valua-
tion. (iii) Both the population service valuation and the customer-specific random
deviation are affine in the device’s print volume. In other words, the population per-
ceives a fixed value of owning the service, and variable values of using the service for
each BW and color page printed. A particular customer deviates from the population
perceived fixed and variable values randomly. We observe that the customer’s per-
ceived fixed value has no implication on her perceived variable values, and vice versa,
while the customer’s perceived variable values per BW and color page are highly
correlated: if her perceived value per color page is 10% higher than the population
value, then there is a 75% probability that she attaches an above population value
per BW page as well. (iv) The population perceived fixed value of MPS decreases
with the customer’s fleet size. For example, for a laser Xerox printer with median
work load1, the population valuation of the service of a 200-printer fleet is 6% lower
than that of a 50-printer fleet. This might indicate the existence of the customer’s
market power: the larger the customer’s device fleet, the more powerful the customer
is in negotiation, hence the less she is likely to pay.
Second, within the set of winning bids yielded by the customer’s pricing model, we
11,700 BW pages and 1,900 color pages per month (see Table 3.1).
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turn attention to the supply side and postulate that risk-aversion plays an important
role in the provider’s decision on the optimal contract to offer. We formulate an opti-
mization problem that captures the risk-aversion of the provider, considers portfolio
effects from the existing contracts, and uses the customer’s pricing model as an input.
Under a mean-variance objective function, we show that the optimal contracts do not
depend on the exact value of the provider’s risk-aversion parameter, as long as he is
risk-averse. That is, the optimal contracts are the ones that minimize the provider’s
total profit variability and charge the predicted customer’s service valuation. In the
empirical analysis, we confirm that our predictions match the observed contracts
significantly better than the benchmark linear regression model. Furthermore, we
observe that the risk-adjusted earnings (i.e., monthly average earnings normalized
by the earnings variability) do not depend on the customer’s industry or fleet size.
Put another way, all customers bring in similar risk-adjusted monthly earnings for
the provider. This might indicate intense competition among the providers as all
customers’ earnings risks are priced in a same way.
One important finding of our empirical analysis is that the MPS provider is better
modeled to be risk-averse than risk-neutral. Our risk-aversion assumption is moti-
vated by the fact that, for the providers, the MPS earnings constitute a significant
part of his overall profit. Indeed, in a recent survey on 435 managed services firms in
19 countries (Kaseya 2011), 82% of the firms report that they derive more than 25% of
annual revenue from managed services, with 23% deriving more than 75%. Therefore,
besides the preference for higher profits, the provider is likely to favor stable service
earnings due to financial frictions and constraints such as short-term funding costs
and budget limitations. On the other hand, however, because the provider serves
many clients with independent service demands, would he still care about the earn-
ings uncertainties that could be diversified away? Therefore, at the portfolio level,
the risk-aversion of the provider is not obvious and it is important to verify whether
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earnings variability is a factor in the provider’s decision. Furthermore, many previ-
ous theoretical studies have assumed that the provider is risk-neutral. By empirically
testing risk-aversion against risk-neutrality, we find that risk-neutral provider might
not be a good assumption in practice.
The customer’s pricing model and the provider’s optimization model constitute
our pricing framework for MPS providers. Their outputs can be used in practice
when providers bid for the service of a new customer. We note that due to confiden-
tiality issues, it is difficult to obtain data from multiple providers, and our empirical
results are derived using the data set from Xerox. However, given the wide variety
of customers in the MPS portfolio of Xerox, who is a leading provider in the US and
Europe with a significant market share, we expect this modeling approach and the
qualitative insights to apply to other MPS providers and possibly to other types of
managed services as well.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we review related literature.
In Section 3 we describe our data set in detail. In Section 4 we discuss managed print
services in more detail and present the model setup. In Section 5 we study the price
elasticity of the printing demand. In Section 6 we formulate the customer’s pricing
model and present corresponding empirical analysis. Section 7 develops and solves
the provider’s optimization model, and discusses the empirical results. Section 8
concludes.
3.2 Literature review
We develop a pricing model that yields reliable estimates of the customer’s service
valuation. This objective shares commonalities with marketing and economics papers
that study individual consumer utilities derived from product or service purchasing.
One widely adopted approach in these studies is the discrete choice model (Berry
1994, McFadden and Train 2000, Chintagunta et al. 2003). In managed services,
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however, the provider proposes customized contracts rather than standard menus
and does not know the contract offerings made by his competitors. As a result, the
provider has no information on the customer’s choice set, unlike the individual con-
sumer service providers such as grocery stores and phone service carriers. Therefore,
it is particularly difficult for the provider to estimate the customer’s service valuation
using standard discrete choice models. In this paper, we propose an alternative model
of the customer’s service valuation and show that it has high explanatory power in
case of managed print services.
MPS pricing falls into the area of pricing with multi-part tariff contracts. In this
context, one standard assumption in the marketing literature is that the consumer’s
utility, and consequently her service usage, depends on service prices (Lambrecht et al.
2007, Iyengar et al. 2008, 2011, Goettler and Clay 2010). In the MPS case, however,
we show that the institutional customers’ service demand is inelastic in service prices
using data set provided by Xerox. As a result, we model the customer’s service usage
as an exogenous stochastic process and show that the customer’s service valuation is
adequately captured with a model independent of the service prices.
A prevalent assumption in the literature on optimal pricing is that the service
provider is risk-neutral. In the context of multi-part contract, examples include Png
and Wang (2010) who study optimal two-part tariff contract for a profit maximizer
with risk-averse buyers, Essegaier et al. (2002) that compare different tariff contracts
for a risk-neutral provider offering access services with capacity constraint, and Sun-
dararajan (2004) on the optimality of offering both fixed payment and usage-based
contracts on information goods. More broadly, Chu et al. (2008) focus on the opti-
mal bundling pricing strategies of a multiproduct firm, and Huang and Sundararajan
(2005) examine the form of optimal pricing plan for utility computing. In this pa-
per, however, we find the optimal multi-part contracts for a risk-averse provider, and
provide empirical evidence that the risk-aversion matters.
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The existing literature on risk management in services is mainly on IT and com-
puting services. Under a linear pricing scheme, Paleologo (2004) examines the profit-
maximizing unit price for a utility computing service seller who imposes distribu-
tional constraint on his gross profit margin. Using similar constraints, Kauffman and
Sougstad (2008) consider the service level that maximizes an IT service provider’s
expected profit under uncertain cost, assuming that the customer’s willingness to
pay can be completely extracted by the provider. These works are similar to ours
in that they assume risk-averse providers and take service demand as external vari-
ables. However, they do not consider the interaction between the customer and service
provider, while we compute the provider’s optimal contracts based on the predicted
customer’s service valuation.
There is a strong interest in the contracts used in after-sales services, amidst the
wave of servicization that swept many manufacturing industries (Cohen et al. 2006).
Kim et al. (2007a), Kim et al. (2007b), and Kim et al. (2010) study performance-based
contracting in military and aviation industries using a principal-agent framework
where the customer finds the optimal contract structure to offer incentives to the
provider for equipment reliability improvement. In a recent empirical study, Guajardo
et al. (2012) compare the product reliability under performance-based contracts and
time and material contracts in aircraft engine services. In MPS, however, there is
only one contract structure adopted in practice—the multi-part tariff contract. This
paper focuses on identifying the optimal contract parameters under the multi-part
tariff structure. In particular, we show that there is no moral hazard as the customer’s
service demand is inelastic in service prices. This is different from the principal-agent
framework and the empirical analysis in Guajardo et al. (2012) where the customer’s
choice between performance-based and cost and material contracts is endogenized.
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3.3 Data
In this section, we describe the data provided by Xerox on its MPS to a number
of institutional customers. We explain the pre-processing steps and characterize the
resulting pricing data set, cost data set, and multi-price data set. We carry out
empirical analysis of the customer’s pricing model and the provider’s optimization
model using the pricing data set and cost data set, respectively. The multi-price data
set is used to study the sensitivity of the printing demand to service prices.
Our raw data consists of three different files: one containing print volume on
devices in our sample during September 2006–August 2012 (hereafter, the “volume
file”); one containing each device’s contract in use during September 2007–August
2012 (hereafter, the “contract file”); and one on the service cost (hereafter, the “cost
file”). The list of variables in the volume file includes: printer ID, meter reads of
cumulative print volume, meter type (BW print or color print), and date of the
record. The contract file provides more information on printers and customers. The
list of variables is: printer ID, printer model, customer name, manufacturer of the
printer, contract in use, and date of the record. The cost file includes supplies cost
on a subset of devices. The list of variables is: printer ID, printer model, name of
the consumables (e.g., toner, catridges, fuser), cost of the consumables, and number
of pages printed while the consumables last.
We carry out the following steps to clean the data. For the volume file, we compute
the monthly BW and color print volume of each device and remove inconsistent
volume entries (e.g., negative monthly BW/color volume due to meter resets). For the
contract file, we remove abnormal entries with zero contract prices or with multiple
different contract records on the same date. For the cost file, we compute each
printer’s consumables cost per BW and color print, respectively.
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3.3.1 Pricing data set
We take the latest contract of each printer in the contract file and find the monthly
volume records under these contracts in the volume file. When merging them together,
we discard printers with fewer than 10 monthly BW or color volume records to ensure
adequate sample size for estimation purposes. The resulting pricing data set consists
of 3,075 printers from 26 institutional customers (private and public companies and
institutions). Each printer has a two-dimensional print volume time series (BW,
color). Unit root tests (augmented Dickey-Fuller test and Phillips-Perron test) reject
the null and accept the stationarity alternative on the BW and color volume series
at 95% significance level. Furthermore, the zero autocorrelation assumption for BW
and color volume series are not rejected in the data set at 95% significance level.
Therefore, we use the volume time series to estimate the marginal distribution of
each device’s monthly print volume. Specifically, we estimate the mean, standard
deviation and correlation of the BW and color print volume for all 3,075 devices, and
summarize the results in Table 3.1. Print volume is the only continuous variable at
the printer level. At the customer level, we compute each customer’s total number
of printers, that is, the fleet size, and the average aggregate monthly BW and color
print volume. Table 3.1 summarizes the customer-level variables.
Besides the print volume, the pricing data set also contains information of each
device’s contract, customer, printer model and manufacturer. Based on this, we define
a number of dummy variables at the printer and customer levels. We first categorize
the 26 customers into 5 industrial segments based on the North America Industry
Classification System (NAICS): Manufacturing; Professional, Scientific, and Technical
Services; Finance and Insurance; Information Technology; and Other Services. Next
we categorize the 73 printer models observed in the data set into 3 classes based on
their technology and functionality: laser printer; solid-ink printer; and laser multi-
functional printer (MFP). This classification is motivated by the discussion with the
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Table 3.1: Continuous variables and descriptive statistics
(µb, µc), (σb, σc), and ρ are the mean, standard deviation and correlation of the monthly BW and
color print volume of each device. This table summarizes these marginal distribution statistics
over all 3,075 printers. N is the number of printers each customer owns in the original contract
file, before cleaning the data. (µaggb , µ
agg
c ) represent the average aggregate BW and color
monthly volume of each customer.
Unit No. of obs. Variable Mean Median Std. dev. Min Max
Printers 3,075
µb 3,324 1,701 4,231 0.2 41,600
µc 3,252 1,872 4,324 0.9 59,540
σb 1,242 683 1,657 0.6 15,569
σc 1,354 799.8 1,784 2.2 22,454
ρ 0.53 0.60 0.32 -0.92 0.99
Customers 26
N 393.3 284.3 294.0 19 839
µaggb 393,100 235,800 427,977 2,053 1,858,000
µaggc 384,600 238,900 449,247 5,811 1,688,000
MPS provider. In practice, different printer models within the same class incur very
similar service costs for the provider and function approximately in the same way for
the customers. Therefore, it is more informative to consider 3 rather than 73 classes
of printers in the analysis. Similar reasoning applies to classifying the customers into
industrial segments. Lastly, we categorize the contracts into 3 types: a pay-per-use
contract with zero fixed price and allowances; a two-part tariff with zero allowances;
and a three-part tariff with both positive prices and allowances. Table 3.2 summarizes
the dummy variables.
3.3.2 Cost data set
After merging the volume, contract and cost files, we obtain the cost data set
consisting of 1,035 printers owned by 8 customers. Printers in the cost data set are
a subset of those in the pricing data set. We do not provide descriptive statistics for
the service costs for confidentiality reasons.
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Table 3.2: Definition of dummy variables and descriptive statistics
Shorthand for industrial segments: “Prof. Serv.”: Professional, Scientific, and Technical Ser-
vices; “Fin. & Ins.”: Finance and Insurance; “IT”: Information Technology; “Others”: Other
Services. Shorthand for printer class: “MFP”: multi-functional printer.
Dummy variable Levels No. of printers No. of customers
Industrial segment
Manufacturing 1,941 12
Prof. Serv. 296 5






Laser MFP 1,825 -
Contract type
Pay-per-use 1,682 -
Two-part tariff 1,275 -




3.3.3 Multi-price data set
In the contract file, we observe that contracts change only in the variable prices
per BW and color print. The fixed price and allowances remain the same throughout
the observation horizon (September 2007–August 2012). We are interested in the
contract’s influence on the print volume. Therefore, we consider only contracts with
multiple variable prices in the cleaned contract file.
Out of a total of 3,435 printers in the cleaned contract file, 650 devices from 8
customers have at least two different BW/color prices. After merging with the volume
file, we obtain the multi-price data set that consists of the monthly print volume and
corresponding contracts of 326 printers owned by 7 customers. Because the BW
and color variable prices do not always change simultaneously, the multi-price data
set includes 279 BW volume series and 292 color volume series with two or three
different BW and color variable prices, respectively. Specifically, 312 series are under
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two different variable prices while 259 are under three variable prices. We partition
each volume series into two or three segments indexed by the corresponding variable
prices. Then within each segment, the BW or color variable price remains constant.
In time order, we call the segments of a particular printer’s BW or color volume series
the early segment, the intermediate segment (if the total number of segments is three),
and the last segment. Table 3.3 summarizes the total and segment lengths of these
BW and color volume series.
Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics for BW and color volume series under multiple prices
Time series on each printer’s monthly volume is partitioned into 2 or 3 segments based on the
corresponding BW or color variable price. Within each segment, the corresponding variable
price remains constant. In time order, these segments are the early segment, the intermediate
segment (if the total number of segment is three), and the last segment, respectively.
Variable No. of obs. Mean Median Std. dev. Min Max
Length of volume series 571 35.43 37 10.50 8 55
Length of early segment 571 5.9 5 4.0 1 20
Length of inter. segment 259 13.0 12 5.6 3 20
Length of last segment 571 23.6 24 11.5 1 50
3.4 Model setup: contracts and random processes
In the following, we first discuss the MPS contacts in detail. Then we model the
print volume and service cost of each device.
Consider a service provider managing printers for M institutional customers. Cus-
tomer i owns Ni printers (i = 1, 2, . . . ,M), each covered by one contract. We use the
customer-printer index (i, j) to denote printer j in customer i’s fleet (j = 1, 2, . . . , Ni;
i = 1, 2, . . . ,M). All printers can print in both BW and color. Subscripts “ijk”
represent the BW (k = b) and color (k = c) aspect of printer (i, j). We sometimes
suppress these indices for the ease of exposition.
Let [0, Tij] be the observation horizon of printer (i, j). The contract in month
t (t = 1, 2, . . . , Tij) is xij(t) ≡ (Fij, Cij(t)T , ATij), where Fij is the fixed monthly
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payment, ATij ≡ (Aijb, Aijc) is the free-usage allowances for BW and color prints,
and Cij(t)
T ≡ (Cijb(t), Cijc(t)) is the variable price per BW and color print once the
allowances are exceeded at month t. The fixed price and allowances are static because
in our data (see Section 3.3.3), only variable prices change over time. Naturally, we
require xij(t) ≥ 0 and write this as xij(t) ∈ R5+, where R+ is the nonnegative real
line. These contracts are more complicated than the commonly seen three-part pricing
contracts, because they cover both the BW and color printing. Based on the number of
nonzero parts in such a contract, we define the following contract types (we ignore the
time argument for simplicity): (i) Pay-per-use: xij = (0, Cijb, Cijc, 0, 0); (ii) Two-part
tariff: xij = (Fij, Cijb, Cijc, 0, 0); (iii) Three-part tariff: xij = (Fij, Cijb, Cijc, Aijb, Aijc).
Now we characterize each device’s monthly print volume. While service pay-
ments reportedly affect service demands of individual consumers (Png and Wang
2010, Lambrecht et al. 2007, Goettler and Clay 2010), this need not be the case
for institutional customers whose core businesses are unrelated to printing. Intu-
itively, printing acts like a utility for these companies. Furthermore, the workload
of a particular printer depends on the employees directly operating it, who are not
price-sensitive because they are not being charged for the pages printed. Finally, ac-
cording to the MPS provider, the intense competition among MPS providers makes it
impossible to charge high prices in practice. Therefore, the customer’s internal print-
ing demand might be inelastic in service prices, at least within a reasonable price
range. We confirm this intuition by analyzing the sensitivity of the printing demand
to service prices using the multi-price data set in Section 3.5. Consequently, we model
printer (i, j)’s monthly print volume as an exogenous stochastic process Dij(t), where
Dij(t) ≡ (Dijb(t), Dijc(t))T and t = 1, 2, . . . , Tij.
We assume that the volume time series Dij(t) of a particular printer is stationary
with zero autocorrelation—hypothesis that is not rejected at 95% significance level
by the data. Under this assumption, a particular volume series has identical marginal
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distributions, that is, Dij(t) ∼ fDij for all t = 1, 2, . . . , Tij, where Tij is the observation
horizon.
Next, we assume that the print volume of different printers have zero covariance,
that is, corr(Dijk, Di′j′k′) = 0 for (i, j) 6= (i′, j′) and for all k, k′ ∈ {b, c}. Formally,
for each printer, we define the mean and variance of D as the following






where σ2ijk = var(Dijk) (k ∈ {b, c}), ρij is the Pearson’s correlation between the BW
and color monthly prints of device (i, j).
The customer’s payment for printer (i, j) in month t is
Pij(t;xij) = Fij + C
T
ij [Dij(t)− Aij]+, (3.2)
where z+ ≡ max{z, 0}. From properties of Dij(t), the printer’s monthly payment,
Pij(t;xij), has identical marginal distribution Pij(t;xij) ∼ fPij(x) for all t and no
autocorrelation.
Now we consider the MPS provider’s service cost. In MPS, the total cost of serving
a customer mainly consists of two parts: labor cost, and supplies and parts cost. For
customers with many Xerox printers, like the majority of Xerox MPS businesses, the
total labor cost is essentially the salaries of technicians who conduct on-site repairs
and preventative maintenance. Therefore, it is fixed with respect to the customer’s
printing demand. The total supplies cost (e.g., toner) is roughly linear in the total
print volume. The total parts cost (e.g., color tubes and cartridges) depends on
each individual printer’s volume and printer-specific factors like the average print job
length and usage frequency. Therefore, the total supplies and parts cost of serving a
customer is the sum of the supplies and parts cost of each printer. The overall cost of
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serving multiple customers, consequently, is the sum of labor and supplies and parts
costs on each individual customer.
Consider the supplies and parts cost of printer (i, j). Let Sij(t) ∈ R+ be the
random supplies and parts cost in month t incurred by the provider (t = 1, 2, . . . , Tij).
We assume that, similar to the print volume, Sij(t) has identical marginal distribution
Sij(t) ∼ fSij for all t = 1, 2, . . . , Tij with zero autocorrelation. Let Γij ∈ R2 represent
the covariance between the monthly cost and demand. Let γij ∈ R2 denote the










3.5 Price elasticity of printing demand
In this section we examine the price elasticity of a customer’s printing demand.
Because we observe no change in the fixed price and allowances of any printer over
the observation horizon, the problem reduces to examining the dependence of each
printer’s volume series on the variable prices. We choose this approach over the
cross-sectional analysis across different printers because it allows us to control better
for unobserved factors at the printer level, thus obtaining more reliable results. We
study the BW and color printing demand separately. We consider the influence of BW
(color) variable price on the corresponding BW (color) volume, because this is the
first-order effect compared to the color (BW) variable price from the same printer2.
We carry out the analysis using the multi-price data set, which consists of 279
BW volume series and 292 color volume series under two or three different variable
prices. For the ease of exposition, we focus on BW printing demand in the following.
For a particular printer, we can view its BW variable price as a “treatment” that
2Indeed, we found that the color (BW) variable price to be insignificant for BW (color) volume
when added as explanatory variables to our model.
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takes continuous values. Within the period that a particular “treatment” is in effect,
we record the responses, that is, the monthly BW print volume. Our task is to test
if the price “treatment” affects the response. Because different printers change their
BW variable price at different months, this is a longitudinal study with unbalanced
design. In addition, we face a multilevel clustered data set with three levels: customer
— printer — monthly volume records. Therefore, it is natural to use linear mixed-
effects models (e.g., Fitzmaurice et al. 2004) which allow randomization at each level.
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ij(t), (3.4)





N(0, δ2m) is the month-level printer-specific error, w
b
0ij ∼ N(0, δ2p) is the printer-level
random effect that remains unchanged over [0, T bij] given a particular printer (i, j),
wb1i ∼ N(0, δ2c ) is the customer-level random effect that remains unchanged for all





and wb1i are mutually independent.
By definition, the price elasticity of the demand is (dD/D)/(dC/C). Therefore,
θb1 gives the demand elasticity of an arbitrary printer (see Hughes et al. 2006). A
well-known problem when estimating demand equations of the form (3.4) is the en-
dogeneity of the price, which leads to biased and inconsistent estimates of the price
elasticity of the demand θb0. Instrumentation, or equivalently, two stage least squares,
is the common approach to account for the endogeneity (see Wooldridge 2010). The
ideal instrumental variable is the one that has high correlation with the variable price
but is independent of the external shocks affecting the print volume. In the case
of MPS, it is particularly challenging to find a good instrumental variable at the
printer level due to the lack of data. We use the public revenue data reported by
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each customer as the instrumental variable because on the one hand, revenue affects
a company’s budget for infrastructural costs and thus the price they would pay for
MPS; on the other hand, revenue is most likely unrelated to internal printing. Similar
choice of instrument can be found in for example Schultz and Tansel (1997), Keng
and Huffman (2010) and Stone et al. (2007). We report the results under both the
basic model (3.4) and instrumentation.
The printer- and customer-level random effects w0ij and w1i are a variant of the
consumer-specific random effects commonly assumed in microeconometrics and mar-
keting literature (McFadden and Train 2000, Chintagunta et al. 2003, Iyengar et al.
2008). In these works, the consumer-specific random effects are used as a parsi-
monious way of accounting for consumer heterogeneity, compared with introducing
customer-level dummy variables. The independence among the random effects from
different consumers indicates the conventional assumption of mutually independent
consumers. In our model (3.4), the printer- and customer-level random effects have
the similar interpretation. More explicitly:
1. By introducing the printer-level random effect wb0ij, we assume that for an arbi-
trary printer, its average monthly BW volume under zero BW price is a normal
random variable oscillating around the population mean θb0 with variance δ
2
p.
This captures the fact that printers used by different companies and employ-
ees are likely to have different average work loads. Besides incorporating the
printer-specific deviations in a parsimonious way, wb0ij also accounts for the
printer-level clustering among the monthly errors vbij(t).
2. Intuitively, different customers’ BW printing demands have different price elas-
ticities. By introducing the customer-level random effect wb1i, we assume that
for an arbitrary customer, her price elasticity randomly varies around the pop-
ulation mean θb1 with variance δ
2
c . Similar to w
b
0ij, this random effect accounts
for the error clustering at the customer level.
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3. Conditional independence assumption: We make two conditional independence
assumptions at the printer level and customer level, which are explained in detail
as follows.
(a) wb0ij: We assume that, given customer i, the unobserved variables affecting
her printer j’s BW volume (j = 1, 2, . . . , Ni) are exogenous and thus can be
modeled as independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random shocks.
This gives the printer-level independence within customer i’s fleet. This
is also intuitive because in practice, within the same company, employees
using different printers might be from distinct departments and for various
reasons.
(b) wb1i: We assume that the unobserved variables affecting the price elasticity
of customer i’s volume (i = 1, 2, . . . ,M) are exogenous and thus can be
modeled as i.i.d. random shocks. This gives the customer-level indepen-
dence.
Lastly, the random variable vbij(t) is the ordinary i.i.d. error term in regression.
The i.i.d. assumption of vbij(t) states that the volume series of a particular printer
has no serial correlation, a hypothesis that is not rejected at 95% confidence level in
the preliminary analysis.
Under model (3.4), the question of whether the BW print volume is elastic in BW
variable price reduces to testing if the population mean of the demand elasticity is
zero. That is, if θb1 = 0. Running the regression on the 279 BW volume series gives a
p-value of 0.14 for θb1 under the basic model (3.4). Using the instrumental variable,
the p-value for θb1 is 0.94. Therefore, our data implies that the BW printing demand
is inelastic in the BW variable price.
We fit a similar model of color printing demand using the 292 color volume series.
We report a p-value of 0.28 (0.18) for the population mean θc1 under the basic model
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(instrumentation). Therefore, the multi-price data set indicates that the color printing
demand is not elastic in the color variable price either. That is, printing demand is
inelastic in the service price over the observed price range.
The result of inelastic demand is quite different from findings in Hughes et al.
(2006), where the price elasticity of gasoline demand is significantly negative both
under the basic model and with crude oil production disruptions as instruments. We
would like to point out that this result should not be surprising given that printing
acts as a utility for these companies, and that the intense competition among ser-
vice providers significantly constrains the service prices offered to/accepted by the
customer. We note that although this finding is based on the winning contracts of
Xerox, given the significant market share of Xerox in MPS, we believe that this result
is representative of the entire MPS industry. Furthermore, it might apply to other
infrastructural services with intense market competition as well.
Remarks on the robustness and generality of results: We have run (3.4) by
incorporating additional printer- and customer-level random effects on the slope and
intercept. We have also added other printer- and customer-level regressors including
customer’s industry and fleet size, and assumed linear functional dependence of the
print volume on variable price in model (3.4). We note that under the linear form
of (3.4), θ1 = 0 indicates that both the mean and variability of a printer’s monthly
print volume do not depend on the variable price. We find p-values for θb1 to be
between 0.08–0.94 and p-values for θc1 between 0.12–0.95 under the basic model and
instrumentation. Due to space constraints, detailed models and results are not shown,
but are available on request.
3.6 Customer’s pricing model
The inelastic printing demand allows us to separate the supply and demand sides
of the problem. In particular, the service demand, that is, the customer’s print
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volume, now becomes an exogenous stochastic process within a reasonable range
of service prices. This range is defined by the observed contracts in the data set,
or, equivalently, the contracts accepted by Xerox customers. Consequently, when
constrained within the set of acceptable contracts, the customer’s print volume is
inelastic in service prices and the specific service prices are completely determined by
the supply side, that is, the service provider.
In this section, we characterize the set of contracts acceptable to the customer,
or the winning contracts in bidding from the MPS provider’s perspective. Particu-
larly, we assume that the customer is risk-neutral, because infrastructural services
are usually small parts of their cash flows and are unrelated to their core businesses.
An acceptable contract then satisfies the condition that the present value of pay-
ment from the customer does not exceed the maximum amount she would pay. We
call this amount the customer’s service valuation. We note that the customer’s ser-
vice valuation could depend on provider characteristics, for example reputation, sales
force, relationship with the customer. In this paper, we focus on different customers’
valuation of the service offered by the same provider. While constraining to one
MPS provider controls for the unobserved provider effects in the empirical analysis,
it might also limit the generality of the results, because similar data from multiple
MPS providers is unavailable due to confidentiality issues. However, given the wide
variety of customers in the MPS portfolio of Xerox, who is a leading provider in the
US and Europe with a significant market share, we expect our modeling approach
and the qualitative insights to apply to other MPS providers and possibly to other
types of managed services.
In the following, we first model the customer’s service valuation using the print
volume, customer and printer characteristics, and the customer’s preferences between
zero- or positive-allowance contracts. This is our customer’s pricing model that yields
the maximum amount the customer would pay. The predicted payments can be
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achieved by combining the five parameters of the MPS contracts in a variety of ways.
Thus, the customer’s pricing model yields a set of acceptable contracts to the cus-
tomer, or winning bids for the provider, over which the demand inelasticity holds.
Applying the customer’s pricing model to the pricing data set (see Section 3.3.1),
we find that it adequately characterizes and reliably predicts the observed payments.
We then derive insights in the customer’s general perception of the value of MPS
provided by Xerox.
3.6.1 Model formulation
Customer i (i = 1, 2, . . . ,M) pays Pij(t;xij) for the service of her printer j (j =
1, 2, . . . , Ni) at month t (t = 1, 2, . . . , Tij) under contract xij. Let Vij(t) represent
customer i’s corresponding valuation of the service offered by a particular provider.
Vij(t) is the maximum amount that customer i would pay for the provider’s MPS to
printer j.
Rather than modeling customer’s decisions explicitly, which is difficult, we capture
customer’s observed actions in a simple statistical model. We assume that Vij(t) can
be described by the following customer’s pricing model:






ijψ0 + u0i) + (α1 +φ1Gi +ψ1Wij + u1i)
TDij(t), (3.5)
where Ui and Gi are customer i’s characteristics while Wij contains printer (i, j)’s
characteristics, u1i ≡ (u1ib, u1ic)T , (u0i, uT1i)
iid∼ N(0,Λ), α, κ, φ, ψ and Λ are model
parameters with appropriate dimensions (i = 1, 2, . . . , 26). In the following, we first
provide the intuition behind (3.5), then discuss the variables and model parameters
in detail.
The pricing model (3.5) assumes that the customer’s valuation of the MPS to a
particular printer is an affine function on the printer’s volume, with the intercept
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and slope varying with the customer and printer characteristics. Specifically, the in-
tercept, (α0 + U
T
i κ + G
T
i φ0 + W
T
ijψ0 + u0i), can be interpreted as the monthly fixed
value of owning the service perceived by customer i. The fixed value of MPS can
arise from the benefits obtained by streamlining the customer’s printing fleet, freeing
up resources that are occupied when there are multiple service vendors, etc. The
2-dimensional slope (α1 +φ1Gi +ψ1Wij + u1i) denotes the variable value of using the
service for each BW and color print perceived by customer i. This linear dependence
assumes that each print produced by printers with the same characteristics owned by
the same customer has the same value. We make this assumption based on the MPS’s
infrastructural nature: MPS derives its value from satisfying the customer’s internal
document needs, rather than the very behavior of printing itself. Consequently, simi-
lar internal document has approximately the same value for the customer. To test for
model misspecification and robustness, we also extend (3.5) to include higher order
terms of the print volume. The result, however, is not as good as (3.5).
Ui, Gi and Wij are public information on the customer and printer. Ui is a 3-by-
1 vector consisting of customer i’s fleet size, and the total BW and color monthly
printing volume (see Tables 3.1 and 3.2). Gi is a 5-by-1 dummy vector indicating the
industrial segment customer i is in. That is, whether customer i is in manufacturing,
professional services, finance and insurance, IT or other services industries. Wij is a 8-
by-1 dummy vector consisting information on printer (i, j)’s manufacturer, technology
and functionality, and contract type (see Table 3.2). We include the contract type
into our pricing model because in practice, customers usually have preferences among
pay-per-use, two-part tariff and three-part tariff contracts (recall the definition of
contract types in Section 3.4). Incorporating it into model (3.5) allows us to gain
insights on how customers with different preferences price the same “product”, that
is, the service.
u0i and u1i are customer-level random variables that account for customer het-
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erogeneity (Goettler and Clay 2010, Chintagunta et al. 2003, Iyengar et al. 2008) on
the perception of the service. u0i and u1i are time-invariant and orthogonal to the
randomness in customer i’s printing demand. Similar to models in Section 3.5, we
make the conditional independence assumption among printers owned by the same
customer and account for clustering at the customer level by introducing u0i and u1i.
We also examined models with industry-level random effects. However, we find that
the variance of the industry-level effect is not significantly different from zero (see
Section 3.6.2.2 for details).
We note that the customer herself need not think of her value process in terms of
(3.5). In fact, she is more likely to evaluate the service of her entire device fleet, rather
than to each individual printer. However, pricing model (3.5) leads to a statistical
model with printers as observation units, whereas a similar model of the overall
service lead to a model with customers as observation units. In practice, the number
of printers is several magnitudes greater than the number of institutional customers.
Consequently, the pricing model (3.5) on printers provides more reliable estimates
on the model parameters and, thus, more reliable predictions for the perceived value
from a new customer. In Section 3.6.2, we estimate the model parameters of (3.5)
based on the information on the provider’s existing customers and their accepted
contracts, and show how the resulting model has high explanatory power.
3.6.2 Empirical analysis
In the following, we present our empirical study on the customer’s pricing model.
We first establish a statistical model from (3.5). After that we draw managerial
insights in the customer’s service valuation using the estimated model parameters
and report model fitting results.
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3.6.2.1 Linear mixed-effects model
We first relate the pricing model (3.5) to the realized monthly payments from
customers to the MPS provider. This yields a linear mixed-effects model with the
realized average monthly payments as response variables, average monthly print vol-









be the observed contract of printer (i, j). By (3.2),







. Following the property of Dij(t), Pij(t; x̂ij) has identical
marginal distribution for all t. The average monthly payment over the service horizon
P̄ij is










Let x∗ij be the provider’s theoretically optimal contract of printer (i, j). Intuitively,
the theoretically optimal expected monthly payment, EPij(x∗ij), is the maximum
amount the risk-neutral customer would pay (see Section 7.1.1). By the customer’s
pricing model (3.5), this maximum amount is
ED Vij = (α0 + UTi κ+GTi φ0 +W Tijψ0 + u0i) + (α1 + φ1Gi + ψ1Wij + u1i)Tµij, (3.7)
where µij ≡ EDij, as defined in Section 3.4. We use ED[·] to make explicit that the
expectation is over the print volume, D.
We assume that the realized average monthly payment of printer (i, j), P̄ij, is
shifted from the theoretically optimal value, EPij(x∗ij), by a random amount due to
the unmodeled exogenous shocks that affect the finalized contracts on printer (i, j).
Let εij represent the random error on printer (i, j), with εij being independent zero-
mean random variables. Formally we have
P̄ij = EPij(x∗ij) + εij. (3.8)
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Combining (3.7) and (3.8), the customer’s expected monthly valuation, ED Vij, is
related to the realized average monthly payment as follows:






ijψ0 + u0i) + (α1 + φ1Gi +ψ1Wij + u1i)
Tµij + εij. (3.9)
We note that the unobserved factors, captured by ε and the random effects u,
do not cause omitted-variable bias in our parameter estimates because they are ex-
ogenous to the system. Specifically, by Section 3.5, the printing demand is inelastic
in service prices. In addition, the customer- and printer-level characteristics, U and
W , are fixed physical properties. Therefore, there exists no variable that can affect
the response and explanatory variables simultaneously. This means that unobserved
variables will not introduce bias to model parameter estimates. Incorporating more
variables helps reduce the unexplained response variability, but does not affect infer-
ences made on the current model (3.9) (Wooldridge 2010).
In the pricing data set, we observe each device’s print volume and payment over at
least 10 months. Given the stationarity of print volume series, we estimate µij by the
arithmetic mean of the observations on printer (i, j), and denote it by D̄ij. Let the
errors due to this estimation be ξij. We assume that ξij are independent zero-mean
random variables. By (3.9), we have






ijψ0 + u0i) + (α1 + φ1Gi + ψ1Wij + u1i)
T D̄ij + εij + ξij.
Let eij ≡ εij + ξij. Then eij are independent random variables. We assume
eij
iid∼ N(0, σ2e). We now derive the following regression model:






ijψ0 +u0i) + (α1 +φ1Gi+ψ1Wij +u1i)
T D̄ij + eij. (3.10)
Equation (3.10) is a linear mixed-effects model with the observed average monthly
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payment as the response variable, the average monthly print volume, customer and
printer’s characteristics as explanatory variables.
3.6.2.2 Parameter estimates and model fitting
We start with the model (3.10) and do model selection based on the Akaike In-
formation Criterion (AIC) and the out-of-sample fitting results. In (3.10), candidate
customer characteristics U are industrial segment, fleet size, and the total BW and
color monthly printing volume (see Tables 3.1 and 3.2). Candidate printer character-
istics W are its manufacturer, technology and functionality, and contract type (see
Table 3.2). We emphasize that model selection based on the out-of-sample fitting
result is critical for model validation purposes and guarantees a relatively robust and
parsimonious model. More importantly, it determines if the customer’s pricing model
(3.5) is successful in terms of uncovering a new customer’s service valuation.
Our final pricing model selected based on AIC and out-of-sample fitting results is
the following:
P̄ij = (α0 + κ logNi +W
T
ijψ0 + u0i) + (α1 + ψ1Wij + u1i)
T D̄ij + eij, (3.11)
where eij
iid∼ N(0, σ2e), (u0i, uT1i)
iid∼ N(0,Λ) is customer-specific random shocks, Wij
consists of information on printer (i, j)’s manufacturer, technology and functionality,
and contract type, Ni is the fleet size of customer i. Table 3.4 shows the parameter
estimates for model (3.11). The baseline case is the non-Xerox laser printer with
zero-allowance contract.
By the fixed-effects estimates in Table 3.4, the fixed and variable values of MPS
to an arbitrary printer are strictly positive. Furthermore, the variable values per
BW print are significantly lower than that per color print. Lastly, the intercept
estimate for the positive-allowance contracts is positive, while the slope estimates
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Table 3.4: Parameters estimates in model (3.11)
The upper panel gives the estimates for fixed-effect coefficients, that is, κ, φ and ψ. The lower
panel gives the estimates for random-effects, that is, the standard deviation and correlation of u0
and u1. Baseline estimates are for non-Xerox laser printer with zero-allowance contracts. Entries
in the “Intercept” column are the coefficient estimates for the corresponding characteristic in the
intercept term of (3.10), that is, κ and ψ0. Similar interpretation applies to BW and color slope
columns. N is the fleet size of each customer. All fixed-effects regressors are categorical except
the fleet size, which is continuous. Significance codes: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Fixed effects
Intercept BW slope Color slope
Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE
Baseline, α -25 101 0.040 ∗∗∗ 0.010 0.260 ∗∗∗ 0.020
Multi-functional, ψ 108 ∗∗∗ 14 -0.004 0.006 -0.016 ∗∗∗ 0.006
Solid-ink, ψ 6 16 0.006 0.008 -0.016 ∗∗ 0.008
Xerox, ψ 102 66 -0.022 ∗∗ 0.010 -0.160 ∗∗∗ 0.020
Positive-allowance, ψ 182 ∗∗∗ 69 -0.030 ∗∗∗ 0.010 -0.020 ∗∗ 0.010
logN , κ -10 19
Random effects u0 u1b u1c
Std. dev., σu 106 0.01 0.04
corr(u0, u1b) = −0.26, corr(u0, u1c) = 0.045, corr(u1b, u1c) = 0.76
are negative. Recall that the baseline corresponds to the customer’s perceived value
under zero-allowance contracts. This result shows that when choosing a positive-
allowance contract, customers attach a higher fixed value but lower variable values to
the service, consistent with our intuition.
By the estimates for the random effects u0 and u1, we see that the standard devia-
tion of the intercept random effect, u0, is much greater than that of the slope random
effect, u1, after normalized by their respective fixed-effect estimates at baseline. This
indicates that there is stronger heterogeneity in the perceived fixed values of the
service than the perceived variable values among institutional customers. One im-
portant factor affecting the customer’s perceived fixed value is the savings obtained in
her financial and human resources when purchasing the MPS. Therefore, this higher
variation in the perceived fixed value may arise from the wide variety of ways by
which different companies manage their printers before adopting MPS. Furthermore,
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the weak correlations between u0 and u1b, u0 and u1c indicate that a particular cus-
tomer’s perceived fixed value, u0, has no implication on her perceived variable values,
u1, for the service and vice versa. That is, customers evaluate the MPS in terms of
two separate parts: the fixed value of owning it, and the variable value when using it.
In contrast, her perceived variable value per BW and color page are highly correlated;
if the customer’s perceived value per color page is 10% higher than the population
average, there is a 75% probability that she attaches an above average value per BW
page.
We note that although the in-sample estimate for the coefficient of logN is not sig-
nificantly different from zero, incorporating logN does improve the predictive power
of the model for a new customer’s service valuation, both in and out of sample. This
might be due to the limited number of customers (26) in our pricing data set. In
fact, we observe that in our cross-validation at the customer level, that is, if we leave
one customer out each time, the mean of the 26 point estimates for the coefficient
of logN is −9.92 with p-value < 0.001. The negative logN coefficient suggests the
market power of large institutional customers: the larger the customer’s device fleet,
the more powerful the customer is in negotiation, hence the less she is likely to pay3.
Table 3.5 shows both the in-sample and out-of-sample fitting results of the final
pricing model. The in-sample statistics are computed when using all the 3,075 printers
in the pricing data set to fit the model. The out-of-sample statistics are computed by
doing cross-validation at the customer level. Specifically, we leave one customer out
as the “new customer,” estimate the pricing model parameters by running regressions
on the rest 25 customers, and then predict the expected service valuation, V̄ij, of the
“new customer.” These are the out-of-sample estimates for the service valuation of
3While customers with large fleet might have dense device distribution, thus lowering the fixed
service cost per printer for the provider and leading to lower payment, we note that it is not likely to
be the reason for the negative logN coefficient because, according to the provider, big institutional
customers usually have branch offices at different places. As a result, the large fleet is possibly
distributed over geographically dispersed locations, and, thus, does not necessarily decrease the
fixed service cost.
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the “new customer.” We rotate this procedure over all 26 customers, pool these
out-of-sample estimates together (payments for 3,075 printers in total), and compare
them with the 3,075 observed average monthly payments P̄ij. We note that this out-
of-sample estimation procedure mimics what happens in practice if the pricing model
is used, because the provider then has no information on the new customer’s earlier
MPS contracts. Under the final pricing model (3.11), the out-of-sample estimates for
customer n (n ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 26}) are given by:
V̄nj = (α̂0 + κ̂ logNn +W
T
njψ̂0) + (α̂1 + ψ̂1Wnj)
T D̄nj, (3.12)
where j = 1, 2, . . . , Nn, α̂, κ̂ and ψ̂ denote the point estimates for these model pa-
rameters from the rest 25 customers. In the cross-validation, the prediction for the
new customer’s expected service valuation, V̄ij, is at the population level. That is,
all random effects of the new customer are set to 0 as they cannot be estimated due
to lack of information. Hence, V̄ij can be viewed as the population valuation of the
service. We note that here we take the contract types on the new customer’s fleet to
be known. This information is indeed conveyed to the provider in practice when he
designs contracts for the customer.
Table 3.5: Model fitting statistics
Mean absolute error Mean absolute percentage error R-square
In-sample 55.5 32% 92%
Out-of-sample 151 53% 65%
By Table 3.5, the pricing model that takes the form of (3.11) has high explanatory
power, both in- and out-of-sample. In particular, recall that by the pricing model
(3.5), an arbitrary customer’s service valuation is the sum of the population valuation
and a customer-specific random amount. The high out-of-sample explanatory power
indicates that the population valuation dominates the customer’s service valuation,
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because we use the population valuation, V̄ , as the out-of-sample estimates. This
is a remarkable result considering customer heterogeneity and the fact that Xerox
faces different competitors when bidding for the business of each customer, indicating
that these peculiarities have weak influences on the customer’s payments/winning
bids. With the help of statistical modeling, we can reliably predict a new customer’s
service valuation, which is the key input to the provider’s optimization problem.
Notes on parameter estimates and model specification: Besides (3.10), we
also consider other model constructs, such as adding higher-order moments of print
volume and industry-level random effects. In particular, we test the within-industry
clustering by testing if the variance of the industry-level random effect is zero. We
cannot reject the null hypothesis of no industry-level clustering. The fact that the
industrial segment does not matter could be due to the infrastructural nature of MPS.
3.7 Optimal MPS pricing
In Section 3.6, we characterized the set of acceptable contracts to the customer
using the customer’s pricing model. Constrained within this set, the print volume
is inelastic in service prices and the pricing problem is completely determined by
the supply side, that is, the provider. In this section, we study how the provider
views these acceptable contracts and investigate whether the provider’s risk prefer-
ence affects his contract decisions in practice. In the following, we first formulate an
optimization problem that assumes a risk-averse provider, considers portfolio effects
from the existing contracts, and uses the customer’s pricing model as an input. This
model yields the optimal contracts for the provider. Next we test empirically the
structural assumptions we made on the provider’s decision making process. In par-
ticular, we validate the optimization model by examining its explanatory power of the




We first propose the provider’s portfolio optimization problem. Then we find the
optimal contracts given the customer’s service valuation.
3.7.1.1 Service provider’s portfolio optimization model
At time 0, the provider’s existing portfolio consists of M customers. The provider
bids for the business of a new customer, the (M+1)-th customer, by offering contracts
that optimize the provider’s expected objective value while still being acceptable
to the customer. The contract acceptance condition is the customer’s individual
rationality constraint. Under the risk-neutrality assumption, a contract of printer j
is accepted by the (M + 1)-th customer if the present value of the payments does not






e−rt EVM+1,j(t) ∀j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , NM+1}, (3.13)
where VM+1,j(t) is the customer’s service valuation under the pricing model, r is the
discount rate and TM+1,j is the service horizon. The time series {PM+1,j(t;xM+1,j)}
follows identical marginal distribution fPM+1,j at each time point. Similarly, the pro-
cess VM+1,j(t) has marginal distribution fVM+1,j . Therefore, EPM+1,j(t;xM+1,j) =
EPM+1,j(xM+1,j) and EVM+1,j(t) = EVM+1,j for all t. The individual rationality
constraint (3.13) reduces to
EPM+1,j(xM+1,j) ≤ EVM+1,j ∀j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , NM+1}. (3.14)
Per our discussion with Xerox, who is a leading provider in the US and Europe
with a significant market share, MPS contributes a significant part of the earnings
in its entire business portfolio. Due to this large weight and the size of each in-
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stitutional customer’s business, Xerox has an incentive to control the variability of
the cash inflows from MPS for financial reasons, such as short-term funding costs
and budget constraints. Therefore, we model the MPS provider with a risk-averse
objective function. Specifically, we assume the following:
Assumption III.1. The provider has mean-variance objective function Us(z;λ) on
the discounted profits and losses from his overall portfolio:
EU(z;λ) = −λvar(z) + E[z], (3.15)
where z is the discounted profits and the constant λ ∈ R+ is the risk-aversion param-
eter.
Parameter λ reflects the service provider’s attitude towards profit uncertainty—
the greater is λ, the more risk-averse is the provider. When λ = 0, the provider is
risk-neutral. In Section 3.7.2.2, we provide evidence for the risk-aversion assumption
by testing it against risk-neutrality.
There are various ways of modeling risk-aversion. In particular, there are two
parallel approaches: utility theory and risk measures. The two strive to achieve similar
things (i.e., capture decision maker’s preferences towards uncertainty in outcomes),
but are based on different assumptions and one does not subsume the other. The
utility theory, based on the seminal work by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947)
is usually favored by economists. The theory of risk measures is favored by risk
managers, actuaries, and finance practitioners. The foundation of risk measures dates
back to Markowitz (1952) and is further developed by, for example, Artzner et al.
(1999). In operations management, both approaches are represented. One of the
simplest risk measures is variance in (3.15). Because of its simplicity it has been
widely applied (see Kim et al. 2007a, Van Mieghem 2007a). The groundbreaking
work by Markowitz (1952) that ignited the development of the portfolio theory is
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based on this metric. Mean-variance objective in (3.15) has a connection with the
utility theory. Specifically, if the utility function is quadratic and uncertainty is
Gaussian, then the expected utility maximization is equivalent to the maximization
of mean-variance objective (3.15). Nonetheless, one should be cautious that the
mean-variance objective function also suffers limitations such as negative marginal
valuation and satiation for sufficiently large wealth (Caldentey and Haugh 2006).
Let O(t) denote the profit process of the provider’s original business from M
customers at time t. Recall that the total service cost for a particular customer
consists of labor cost, which is independent of the print volume, and supplies and
parts cost. The supplies and parts cost depends on the volume and is the sum of the
cost on each printer. Under the mean-variance utility (3.15), we can normalize the
fixed labor cost to zero without loss of generality. Recall that in Section 3.4, we use
Sij(t) to represent the supplies and parts cost of printer (i, j). Then the total cash






(Pij(t;xij)− Sij(t)) . (3.16)
Note that O(t) has identical marginal distribution fO for all t, and no autocorrelation,
because Pij(t;xij) and Sij(t) are unautocorrelated stationary processes. Let X ≡
(xM+1,1, . . . , xM+1,NM+1) be the collection of all contracts for the (M+1)-th customer’s





PM+1,j(t, xM+1,j)− SM+1,j(t). (3.17)
I(t;X) ∼ fI(X) for all t and has no serial correlation for the same reasons as O(t) has.
Total cash flow to the provider is O(t) + I(t;X).
Let τ be the provider’s planning horizon. By (3.14) and (3.15), the provider solves
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s.t. EPM+1,j(xM+1,j) ≤ EVM+1,j ∀j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , NM+1}, (3.18b)
X ≡ (xM+1,1, . . . , xM+1,NM+1) ∀j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , NM+1}. (3.18c)
That is, the provider selects contracts for the new customer so as to maximize the
expected discounted cumulative profits from all M + 1 customers and minimize the
profit variance.
3.7.1.2 Printer-specific optimization
We can write the provider’s optimization problem (3.18) as follows.
Proposition III.2. The service provider’s optimization problem (3.18) for the profits
and losses from all the customers can be written as the following variance minimization
problem for the profits and losses from the new customer with binding individual





var (Pj(xj)− Sj) (3.19a)
s.t. EPj(xj) = EVj ∀j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}, (3.19b)
X ≡ (x1, x2, . . . , xN) xj ∈ R5+ ∀j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}, (3.19c)
where X is the set of contracts offered to the new customer.
Proof. Recall that I(t;X) and O(t) are stochastic processes with zero serial correla-
tion. Furthermore, I(t;X) ∼ fI(X), O(t) ∼ fO for all t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , τ}. Therefore, the
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e−rt E [I(X) +O] . (3.20)
In addition, corr(Dij, Di′j′) = 0 for all (i, j) 6= (i′, j′), indicating cov(I(X), O) = 0














By (3.2), the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) condition on fixed monthly price, Fj
requires
−1 + u− uF = 0,
where u and uF are the KKT multipliers for the individual rationality constraint on
printer j and Fj ≥ 0, respectively. Because uF ≥ 0, we have u > 0. By the comple-
mentarity condition, the individual rationality constraint on printer j is binding at
the optimum. Then in the objective (3.21),
∑N
j=1 E[Pj(xj) − Sj] =
∑N
j=1 E[Vj − Sj]
is independent of contract x. Therefore, the optimization problem (3.18) reduces to
variance minimization with binding constraints (3.19). 
Optimization problem (3.19) is difficult to solve analytically. However, because
the objective function is the sum of the objectives on individual printers and the
constraints are per printer, in (3.19) one cannot do better than optimize each printer




s.t. EPj(x) = EVj. (3.22b)
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Problem (3.22) states that under an exogenous upper bound EVj on printer j’s
monthly payment, the provider looks for the best contract, xj, so that his monthly
profit on printer j equals the upper bound and has the lowest variance. Thus, an
ideal contract offsets all the fluctuations in the provider’s service cost, if possible.
3.7.1.3 Optimal contracts
We now solve the printer-specific optimization problem (3.22). In the following
analysis, we suppress the customer and printer indices for simplicity.
Under given print allowances, A, the service payment is a function of the fixed
and variable prices. To make this dependence explicit we let PA(F,C) represent the




s.t. EPA(F,C) = EV, (3.23b)
has a concave objective value function in the fixed and variable prices, (F,CT ). There-
fore, KKT conditions are both sufficient and necessary. We write the optimal fixed
and variable prices under given allowances A as F ∗(A) and C∗(A), respectively.
Consider first the extreme case where A = (∞,∞)T . Intuitively, when the cus-
tomer has infinite allowances, she only makes a constant monthly payment equal to
the fixed price, F . Thus, to extract the customer’s service valuation, the provider
sets F ∗(∞,∞) = EV , C∗(∞,∞) = (0, 0)T . The optimal contract under infinite
allowances is a fixed payment contract, x∗ = (EV, 0, 0,∞,∞). In terms of risk mit-
igation, such a contract does not affect the provider’s profit fluctuation. We use the
fixed payment contract as the benchmark in our analysis. Let U0 be the expected
objective value of the provide under the optimal fixed payment contract: U0 ≡ var(S).
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The service cost does not depend on the contract term, x. Therefore, the provider
selects the optimal fixed and variable prices, F ∗(A) and C∗(A), so that his profit
variability is minimized. In the following, we solve for the optimal variable and
fixed prices, C∗(A) and F ∗(A) and derive the improvement in the expected objective
value of a finite-allowance contract over U0. We first define some notation. When
A < (∞,∞)T , let
















Using notation (3.25) and (3.26), optimization problem (3.24) becomes
max
F≥0, C≥0
2CT Γ̃− CT Σ̃C, (3.27a)
s.t. F + CT µ̃ = EV. (3.27b)
Proposition III.3. Given the print allowances A, the following is the solution of
(3.27).
(i) Positive fixed price: If the fixed price is positive under the variable prices C+(A)
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defined below, that is, EV − µ̃TC+(A) > 0, then C∗(A) = C+(A) and F ∗(A) =


















T U0 + λγ̃2c σ̃2c
(ii) Zero fixed price: If the fixed price is negative or zero under the variable prices
C+(A), that is, EV − µ̃TC+(A) ≤ 0, then C∗(A) = C0(A) as defined below,




























































Proof. We prove Proposition III.3 as the following.
Let uF ≥ 0, ub ≥ 0 and uc ≥ 0 be the KKT multipliers of the inequality constraints
F ≥ 0, Cb ≥ 0 and Cc ≥ 0, respectively. Let v be the KKT multiplier to the equality
constraint F +CT µ̃ = EV . The KKT condition on F yields uF = v. Then the KKT
condition on C is




We proceed by discussing whether uF = 0 or uF > 0. That is, we solve the
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following two sets of equations on the variable price C:
−2Γ̃ + 2Σ̃C −
ub
uc
 = 0, (3.28a)
C ≥ 0, ub ≥ 0, uc ≥ 0, (3.28b)
and
−2Γ̃ + 2Σ̃C + uF µ̃−
ub
uc
 = 0, (3.29a)
CT µ̃ = EV, (3.29b)
C ≥ 0, ub ≥ 0, uc ≥ 0. (3.29c)
Let C∗i(A) and C∗ii(A) be the solutions to (3.28) and (3.29), respectively. Both




2CT Γ̃− CT Σ̃C, (3.30)
max
C≥0, CT µ̃=EV
2CT Γ̃− CT Σ̃C. (3.31)
For C∗i(A) to be feasible in the original problem (3.27), we further require F ≥ 0.
That is,
EV − µ̃TC∗i(A) ≥ 0. (3.32)
If (3.32) holds, then (EV − µ̃TC∗i(A), C∗i(A)) satisfy all the KKT conditions for the
original optimization problem (3.27) and, thus, is optimal. Similarly, for C∗ii(A) to
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be feasible in (3.27), we further require
uF > 0. (3.33)
If (3.33) holds, (0, C∗ii(A)) satisfy all the KKT conditions and, thus, is optimal.
With a concave objective function, (3.23) has a unique solution on (F ≥ 0, C ≥ 0).
Indeed, the feasibility conditions (3.32) and (3.33) complement each other. Further-
more, we will see that if the equality holds in (3.32), then C∗i(A) = C∗ii(A). In
the following, we first characterize the solutions to optimization problems (3.30) and
(3.31), and after that we give the solution to the original problem (3.27).
Lemma III.4. Given the print allowances A, C∗i(A) solves the optimization problem
(3.30) and it is given by
C∗i(A) =


















Lemma III.4 describes the solution to the optimization problem (3.30) when
C∗i(A) falls in one of the mutually exclusive sets: (Cb > 0, Cc > 0), (Cb > 0, Cc = 0)
and (Cb = 0, Cc > 0), respectively. These three sets and (Cb = 0, Cc = 0) are parti-
tions of the feasible region C ≥ 0 of the optimization problem (3.30). However, under
finite allowances, a contract with no variable payment, i.e., C = 0, is never optimal
as long as the sensitivity of the service cost to print volume is nonzero. Therefore, the
solution to the convex optimization problem (3.30) must be in one and only one of the
three sets. Inequalities on the correlation coefficient ρ̃ give the conditions under which
the solution falls in the corresponding set, or equivalently, takes the corresponding
C∗i(A) value.
Lemma III.5. Given the print allowances A, C∗ii(A) solves optimization problem
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Lemma III.5 describes the solution to the optimization problem (3.31) when
C∗ii(A) falls in ones of the mutually exclusive sets (Cb > 0, Cc > 0), (Cb > 0, Cc = 0)
and (Cb = 0, Cc > 0), respectively. These three sets are partitions of the region
S = {C : C ≥ 0, CT µ̃ = EV } in (3.31). Therefore, the solution to the convex opti-
mization problem (3.31) must be in one and only one of the three sets. Inequalities
on the correlation coefficient ρ̃ give the conditions under which the solution falls in
the corresponding set, or equivalently, takes the corresponding C∗ii(A) value.
Proposition III.3 is proved by combining Lemma 3.34 and Lemma III.5. 
In practice, the customer decides whether to use a zero- or positive-allowance con-
tract of a particular printer. By Proposition III.3, if zero-allowance contract is pre-
ferred, then the optimal contract is x = (F ∗(0, 0), C∗(0, 0), 0, 0). If positive-allowance
contract is preferred, then the optimal contract has to be solved numerically. Specif-
ically, we need to compute and compare the optimal expected objective value U∗(A)
under all positive allowances using Proposition III.3. Fortunately, as observed in prac-
tice, the set of positive allowances is rather limited, possibly due to administrative
concerns. The fixed and variable prices, on the other hand, takes continuous values.
Therefore, finding the optimal contract requires solving continuous optimization prob-




Because service cost is an input to the optimization model, we carry out the
empirical study using the cost data set (see Section 3.3.2), which consists of 1,305
printers from eight customers with consumables costs. The cost data set consists
of the latest contract, monthly print volume, and consumables costs per page of
each printer. We assume that the monthly service cost is affine in print volume D:
S = (γo)TD + Z, where Z is independent of both Db and Dc, γ
o ≡ (γob , γoc )T are the
provider’s service costs per BW and color print.
We first compare the provider’s risk-adjusted monthly earnings from these eight
customers. This provides insights into how the MPS provider prices earnings risks
of different customers. Under the mean-variance objective, the provider measures
the earnings variability using the variance. Therefore, we mean the provider’s risk-
adjusted earnings of printer (i, j) by normalizing the average monthly earnings by the
earnings’ standard deviation. Let Iij(t) ≡ Pij(t;xij)− Sij(t) represent printer (i, j)’s
monthly earnings in month t under observed contract xij. Then Iij(t) has identical
marginal distribution fIij , where Iij ≡ Pij(xij) − Sij. Let IRAij be the risk-adjusted
earnings of printer (i, j). By definition, IRAij ≡
Īij√
var(Iij)
. To test if the risk-adjusted
profit is related to customer-specific characteristics such as industrial segment and
fleet size, we establish the following mixed-effects model
IRAij = G
T
i β0 + β1 logNi + ui + eij, (3.36)
where Gi is the 5-by-1 dummy vector indicating the industrial segment of customer
i (i = 1, 2, . . . , 8), Ni is the fleet size of customer i, ui is the customer-level random
effect accounting for customer-level clustering, and eij is the random error. ui and eij
are mutually independent zero-mean normal random variables.
Under the observed contracts, we find that neither β0 or β1 is statistically signifi-
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cant for the 1,035 printers. This result means that all the customers bring in similar
risk-adjusted monthly earnings for the provider. Thus, all customers’ earnings risks
are priced in a same way possibly due to intense competition among the providers.
In the following, we turn to examine our modeling assumptions. We first validate
the optimization model of the provider’s decision making process. Next we compare
the risk-aversion assumption to the risk-neutrality alternative. We apply our opti-
mization model in a way that mimics the practice. Specifically, when computing the
optimal contracts for a particular customer, we take her as a new customer and predict
her service valuation using all the other customers’ data as in the out-of-sample test
procedure described in Section 3.6.2.2. This predicted maximum average monthly
payment, V̄ , along with the customer’s contract type preference, the print volume
and service cost, are taken as inputs of the optimization model (3.19), which yields
the optimal contracts.
3.7.2.1 Test of the optimization model
We compare the predicted contracts from the optimization model (3.19) with
the corresponding actual contracts. Let x∗ij and x̂ij be the theoretical and observed
contracts on printer (i, j), respectively. We observe only zero-allowance contracts in
the cost data set. That is, all the eight customers prefer zero-allowance contracts
on these printers. Therefore, we set the allowances in x∗ and x̂ to zero for all the
printers under consideration. We compute correlations between the corresponding
contract parameters in x∗ and x̂. These correlations quantify the explanatory power
of our optimization model (3.19). To benchmark the performance of model (3.19),
we also predict the contract parameters using a simple linear regression model with
no structural assumptions on the provider’s decision making process. We call this
the null model and use x̃ ≡ (F̃ , C̃b, C̃c, 0, 0) to denote the predicted contract from the





ij ηb + ωijb, (3.37a)
C̃ijc = Y
T
ij ηc + ωijc, (3.37b)
F̃ij = V̄ij − C̃Tijµij, (3.37c)
where ωijb
iid∼ N(0, δ2nb), ωijc
iid∼ N(0, δ2nc), and Y Tij ≡ (µTij, σijb, σijc, ρ, γTij, V̄ij) is the
vector of inputs of the optimization model (3.19). Because the expected monthly
payment under the optimal contract equals the maximum amount acceptable to the
customer, V̄ , there are only two degrees of freedom in x̃. This is reflected in the
equality on the fixed price F̃ in (29c). In essence, the null model assumes linear
dependence of the contract parameters on the inputs of the optimization model.
Besides the basic linear form of (3.37), we also tested models with higher-order terms.
However, we do not observe significant changes from the result when using (3.37).
Comparing the explanatory power of the null model with the optimization model
highlights the improvements gained from structural modeling. More importantly, the
null model is a benchmark that, in some sense, “quantifies” the complexity of the
actual contracting process, thus facilitating the evaluation of the optimization model.
We obtain optimal contracts x∗ and null predictions x̃ following the procedure
below.
Step 1: Select customer i (i = 1, 2, . . . , 8) as the new customer.
Step 2: Predict service valuation of all her printers, V̄ij (j = 1, 2, . . . , Ni), by (3.12)
as described in the out-of-sample test of Section 3.6.2.2.
Step 3.1: Find x∗ij (j = 1, 2, . . . , Ni) by solving the optimal problem (3.38) below
for printer j under A = (0, 0)T . The estimated maximum average monthly
payment, V̄ij, correlated cost, γij, and observed print volume, Dij, are model
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inputs.
minx var(Pij(x)− Sij), (3.38a)
s.t. EPij(x) = V̄ij, (3.38b)
x ∈ {(F,CT , 0, 0) : F ∈ R+, C ∈ R2+}. (3.38c)
Step 3.2: Find x̃ij (j = 1, 2, . . . , Ni) by first estimating null model parameters ηb
and ηc using data from the other 7 customers, then predicting the variable and
fixed prices based on the estimated parameters and model (3.37).
Following this procedure, we obtain 1,035 optimal contracts x∗ and 1,035 null
predictions x̃. Because x∗, x̃ and x̂ all have zero allowances, we compare the fixed
and variable prices of the predicted x∗ and x̃, with the observed x̂, respectively. Table
3.6 presents the correlations between the corresponding terms in the predicted and
observed contracts. The poor explanatory power of the null model and the significant
improvement of the optimization model validate our structural formulation on the
provider’s decision making process. It indicates that our optimization model captures
major factors in the actual contracting process.
Table 3.6: Correlations between predicted and observed prices
Fixed price BW variable price Color variable price
(95% C.I.) (95% C.I.) (95% C.I.)
Optimal contract: x∗
0.55 0.16 0.11
(0.51, 0.60) (0.10, 0.22) (0.05, 0.17)
Contract from regression: x̃
0.16 −0.24 −0.67
(0.10, 0.22) (−0.18, −0.30) (−0.63, −0.70)
3.7.2.2 Test of risk-aversion assumption
In our optimization model, one critical assumption is that the provider is risk-
averse with mean-variance objective: U(z) = E[z] − λvar(z), where λ is the risk-
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aversion parameter and z is the cumulative discounted earnings. While on the one
hand, Xerox has an incentive to control the variability of the MPS cash inflows for
financial reasons given the significant weight of MPS in its business portfolio; on the
other hand, since he serves many clients with independent printing demands, he might
not concern about the earnings uncertainties when deciding the contracts as they
could be diversified away. Therefore, the risk-aversion of the provider is not immediate
and it is important to verify whether risk-aversion is a factor in the provider’s decisions
or not. In the following analysis, we test the risk-aversion assumption in the context
of MPS by testing the null hypothesis below:
Hypothesis 1. The optimal contracts obtained under the risk-neutrality (RN) as-
sumption match the observed contracts as well as those under the risk-aversion (RA)
assumption.
To test Hypothesis 1, we first characterize the optimal contracts under the RN
assumption. Next we introduce the normalized squared distance as a measure for the
“match” between the predicted and observed contracts in Hypothesis 1. Finally, we
formulate Hypothesis 1 mathematically using the normalized squared distance and
test it by a Student’s t-test.
A risk-neutral provider has λ = 0. Under our constrained optimization model,
this means that any contract that charges the customer at the maximum accept-
able amount is optimal for the provider. Formally, for printer (i, j), any contract
(F,CT , AT ) that satisfies





is equally likely to be selected by the provider to be the optimal contract. This is
because under the RN assumption, the average monthly earning is the only criterion
by which the provider selects the contracts. Furthermore, recall that all printers in
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the cost data set are preferred to have zero-allowance contracts. We set A = 0 in
(3.39) and obtain
F + CTµij = V̄ij, (3.40)
where F and C are nonnegative. Recall that the expected monthly print volume,
µij, and the predicted customer’s payment, V̄ij, are both printer-specific and fixed.
Therefore, (3.40) defines a unique bounded plane S = {(F,Cb, Cc)} for each printer.
Any point (F,Cb, Cc) in plane S is equally likely to be selected by the provider and
offered to the customer. In other words, because both the provider and the customer
are RN, the winning bids are also the optimal bids for the provider. In contrast,
under the RA assumption the provider selects one unique point in the RN plane S to
be the optimal contract.
Now we specify the meaning of “match” between the predicted and observed
contracts. We define it as the normalized squared distance between the predicted
and observed contracts as follows.
Definition III.6. The normalized squared distance d between the predicted contract

















where Lf = V̄ , Lb = V̄ /µb and Lc = V̄ /µc are the maximum values of F , Cb and Cc
under equality (3.40), respectively.
Under the RA assumption, we have one unique prediction for each printer, thus
one unique distance. Let the distance between the predicted and observed contracts
of printer l be dAl (l = 1, 2, . . . , 1035). d
A
l measures the “match” of the RA optimal
contract to the observed contract of printer l. Recall that this predicted contract
under the RA assumption is one unique point in the RN plane S.
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Under the RN assumption, all points in the RN plane S are optimal. Therefore,
there are infinitely many optimal contracts for each printer, thus infinitely many
distances. Let dNl (F,Cb, Cc) denote the distance between the observed contract of
printer l and one particular predicted contract (F,Cb, Cc) in the optimal plane Sl
defined by (3.40) (l = 1, 2, . . . , 1035).
To formulate Hypothesis 1 mathematically, we further characterize the “match”









Intuitively, this is the sum of distances from points in the RN plane weighted by
their corresponding probabilities of being chosen as the RN contract. Therefore, dNl
represents the average “match” of the RN plane Sl to the observed contract of printer
l. We compute the integral in (3.42) numerically by dividing the plane Sl into evenly
spaced small areas.
Now we are ready to compare the “match” of the RN predictions with the “match”
of the RA predictions. In particular, we define ∆l to be the difference between the
average distances of the RN and RA contracts for printer l: ∆l ≡ dNl − dAl . ∆l is a
random variable, contingent on the printer under consideration. Under Hypothesis
1, the mean of ∆ should be 0. That is, for an arbitrary printer in the population,
the randomly picked contract under the RN assumption is expected to be as close to
the true contract as the RA contract. Our 1,035 printers provide 1,035 samples of ∆.
Therefore, Hypothesis 1 can be written as the following:
Hypothesis 1a.
(H0) E[∆] = 0,
(H1) E[∆] < 0.
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Hypothesis 1a is a one-sided test with the alternative hypothesis being that the
RA assumption matches the data better than the RN assumption over the population.
We are interested in the testing if the mean of ∆ is 0. Assume that ∆l of different
printers are i.i.d. normal random variables with unknown mean and variance (plots
of {∆l} exhibit features of a normal random variable). Then we can test Hypothesis
1a using a Student’s t-test. The t-statistic is −15.2, thus rejecting H0 and accepting
the alternative H1. We also tested the hypothesis using normalized absolute distance
and the t-statistic is −13.7. These results4 mean that for an arbitrary printer, the
predictions under the RA assumption match the observations better than that under
the RN assumption. That is, the service provider is better modeled to be risk-averse
than risk-neutral.
3.8 Concluding remarks
We examine contractual interactions between the managed print service provider
and customers using proprietary data sets provided by Xerox. We develop two models:
one on the customer’s valuation of the service, and the other on the provider’s selection
among the set of contracts acceptable to the customer obtained from the first model.
In the first model on the customer’s side, we show that the customer’s printing
demand is inelastic in service prices over the observed price range. Furthermore,
we propose a customer’s pricing model that generates reliable forecasts for the cus-
tomers’ service payments. We find that customers in different industries evaluate
the MPS in the same way and pay less for each printer when the fleet size is large.
The customer’s service payments also depend on her preferences between zero- and
positive-allowance contracts, and printer-specific characteristics. We note that due to
4We also tested Hypothesis 1 by comparing the chances that an RN contract has smaller distance
than the RA contract. In particular, we computed the probability p that a randomly-picked RN
contract is better than the RA contract, and tested (H0) E[p] = 0.5 against (H1) E[p] < 0.5. We
carried out a percentile bootstrap procedure (Cameron and Trivedi 2005) and rejected (H0) under
the normalized squared and absolute distances at 95% significance level.
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confidentiality issues, it is difficult to obtain data from multiple providers, and our
empirical results are derived using the data set from Xerox. However, given the wide
variety of customers in the MPS portfolio of Xerox, who is a leading provider in the
US and Europe with a significant market share, we expect this modeling approach
and the qualitative insights to apply to other MPS providers and possibly to other
types of managed services as well.
In the second model on the provider’s selection of the optimal contracts, we formu-
late a contract optimization problem that captures the risk-aversion of the provider,
considers portfolio effects from the existing contracts, and uses customer’s pricing
model as an input. We validate our modeling assumptions empirically. Furthermore,
we observe that the risk-adjusted earnings (i.e., monthly average earnings normalized
by the earnings variability) do not depend on industry or fleet sizes. Put another
way, all customers bring in similar risk-adjusted monthly earnings for the provider.
This may indicate intense competition among the providers as all customers’ earnings
risks are priced in a same way.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first in-depth study of pricing in
managed services. Our approach provides a new way of tackling information asymme-
try between service providers and customers. It offers a viable construct for studies
on managed services for institutional customers. One interesting extension for future
research is to consider the problem in the dynamic setting and incorporate the option
of renegotiation. In practice, the sales representatives tend to “seal the deal” first
and adjust the terms later. This is analogous to a real option whose value is related
to the profit foregone before renegotiation. Another possible direction to pursue in
the future research is to account for administrative cost associated with the number
of unique contracts in a service portfolio. In the paper, both the number of unique
contracts and the set of printers each contract covers are external variables. Intro-
duction of administrative costs will endogenize them as decision variables and explore
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Price dynamics of used durable goods: A dynamic
factor model approach
4.1 Introduction
The price dynamics of used durable goods provides valuable information on the
movement patterns of the market, and how a specific product will be affected by an
operational decision from the higher management or a shock in the external economic
condition. In this paper, we study the price dynamics of a particular type of durable
goods (exact name nondisclosable due to confidentiality reasons) using resale price
data throughout the country. Our econometric exercise serves two goals and, thus,
naturally divides into two parts: (i) Identify the comovements among the resale prices
across the entire market as well as from products with similar functionalities. Examine
the effects of external shocks on the resale prices. (ii) Identify the comovements
among products of the same brand and original equipment manufacturer (OEM)
after controlling for the fluctuations due to external effects. Study the impacts of
brand-/OEM-level shocks on the resale prices.
Our research problem falls within the broad realm of making inferences and fore-
casting using a panel data set with a large number of predictors in macroeconomics.
The standard and widely used approach is to extract a few number of dynamic latent
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factors from the panel data set that explain a significant fraction of the variability
of each time series, i.e., the dynamic factor models (Breitung and Eickmeier 2006,
Stock and Watson 2011, 2006). In the literature, there are mainly two approaches
to dynamic factor models: a non-parametric one that primarily relies on the method
of principal component (Eickmeier 2009, Sala 2003, Eickmeier and Breitung 2006,
Forni and Reichlin 1996) and a parametric approach that casts the model into the
state space framework1 (Gregory et al. 1997, Kose et al. 2003, Diebold et al. 2006,
Moench et al. 2011). In the former, principal component analysis (PCA) first extracts
a few static factors (Bai and Ng 2002), which are then subject to vector autoregres-
sion study (VAR) and identification schemes to further identify factor dynamics and
shocks. In the latter, researchers impose structural assumptions on the data and
factor dynamics first and then estimate the model parameters and latent factors. In
comparison, the PCA method is less computationally intensive and shown to have
nice properties in forecasting (Stock and Watson 2002). The state space method, on
the other hand, is better for inference purposes and provides a more holistic way for
model estimation. In this paper, as we are primarily interested in making inferences
on the latent factors, the state space approach is adopted.
Our work has the following features. First, compared with similar studies in
macroeconomics, this research problem is complicated by its operational details.
There are three essential metrics associated with each used product: its product
model, age and usage level. While all new goods of the same product model are iden-
tical, special care has to be taken to explicitly control for the depreciation effects due
to aging and usage in our study, so as to obtain well-defined factors and derive mean-
ingful insights. Second, we group the products into a number of segments based on
their functionality and distinguish between the market-wide comovements (captured
by the industry factor) and segment-specific comovements. This multi-level dynamic
1For a comprehensive introduction on state space models, see Durbin and Koopman (2001).
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factor model captures the fact that due to strong heterogeneity, products within dif-
ferent segments might have their own dynamics in addition to the industry factor. It
shares some commonality with Kose et al. (2003), and particularly Moench and Ng
(2011), Moench et al. (2011), and Diebold et al. (2008). Third, we further examine
the OEM- and brand-level comovements after controlling for the external segment
factors. This study is particularly relevant to industrial practitioners because, while
the industry and segment factors are helpful in understanding how the market as a
whole responds to exogenous shocks such as a financial downturn, they provide little
guidance on how a particular business decision or OEM/brand-specific incident af-
fects the associated products. The study on the OEM and brand comovements, on
the other hand, sheds some light in this direction.
In this paper, we show that, despite the heterogeneity in product models and
brands, there are strong comovements throughout the used goods market and within
each segment. The latent industry and segment factors are able to capture up to
81.4% of the variation of a particular product’s price changes. This dependence on
the latent factors, or equivalently, the level of within-segment comovement, however,
varies with segment. In particular, the segment with fancy and pricey products
exhibits weaker comovement than others. This is an intuitive result because ordinary
goods targets the majority of the population and is thus more sensitive to changes in
the external economic condition, which in turn renders the brand-level heterogeneity
secondary effects in the products’ price dynamics. The fancy and pricey products,
on the other hand, target a much smaller crowd generally with higher income. As a
result, their price dynamics is not as contingent on the general economic condition
and the heterogeneity of the product models comes into play.
We report that the industry factor is very persistent. The persistence of segment-
specific comovements after controlled for the industry factor (i.e., the controlled seg-
ment factors), however, vary. The persistence property of a dynamic factor character-
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izes how long into the future a one-time shock’s effect lasts. Therefore, the industry
factor and some controlled segment factors have long memories. As an example, we
study the lasting impacts of the 2008 financial crisis on the entire market and each
segment.
In the OEM analysis, we report that the OEM- and brand-level comovements
are much less persistent than the industry and segment factors. Furthermore, we
find that: (i) Termination of a brand does not have a material impact on the resale
prices of the associated products. (ii) Big recalls due to product malfunction induce
significant price drops in the associated brand. These negative impacts, however, do
not spill-over to other brands owned by the same OEM.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data and
measures to account for the aging and usage depreciation in detail. Section 3 presents
our model. Section 4 explains the estimation results for the industry and segment
factors. Section 5 discusses the OEM- and brand-level analysis. Section 6 concludes.
4.2 Data
Our data set contains nationwide resale prices of a large class of used durable
goods during 2000:1–2012:12 (name of the goods nondisclosable due to confidential-
ity reasons). Each product sold has one basic attribute—model, which specifies the
product’s functionality and design, and signifies the product’s brand and OEM. Take
the automobile industry for example. Focus, Corolla and Camero are all vehicle mod-
els, whose brands are Ford, Toyota and GMC, and whose OEMs are Ford, Toyota
and GM, respectively. One OEM could produce multiple brands. For example, be-
sides the Ford brand, OEM Ford also owns Lincoln. Besides the Toyota brand, OEM
Toyota also produces Lexus. Besides the GMC brand, OEM GM also manufactures
Chevrolet, Cadillac, etc. Our data set covers a variety of brands and models within
the class of durable goods under consideration.
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From the data set, we know the identification number of each product sold, the
sale month and price, as well as the product’s usage level, brand, model, and the
production year of the model. Here the usage level is a continuous metric. It could
be the operation hours in cases of used capital equipment, or the mileage in cases of
used vehicles. The production year of the model, on the other hand, is related to the
model generation. This metric is most relevant in industries with regular new product
launches such as electronics and automobile. The data set also contains assessment on
the overall condition of each product—whether it is fair, thus sold with insurance; or
junk, thus sold without insurance. We only consider products under normal condition
which are sold with insurance in our study. We define the age of a product as the
difference between its resale time and the production year of the model, as we do not
have information on when a particular product is first purchased/leased. To avoid
significant depreciation effects and extremely old models, we only consider products
that are 0 to 6 years old. These products constitute more than 90% sales volume of
the original data set. This way we obtain a data set with 39,406,520 used products
sold over 13 years.
4.2.1 Data preparation
Our goal is to study the price dynamics of this used goods market on a macro
level. We hope to identify and understand latent dynamic factors that drive the
observed resale price changes. While similar problems have been widely studied in
macroeconomics and finance literature (Eickmeier 2009, Kose et al. 2003, Diebold
et al. 2008), the operations nature of our research question requires special attention
in data preparation in order to derive meaningful insights. In the following, we discuss
the complications of our data set and outline the procedure we follow to prepare our
data for further analysis.
Instead of time series of well-defined financial indexes and economic variables, we
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observe resale prices of individual products. Therefore, before employing any econo-
metric technique, we need to aggregate the individual product prices into a number of
time series. A natural way to do this is at each month to aggregate the resale prices
of all products of the same model together. This way we get one resale price time
series per model. The complication, however, is that the used products of a particular
model sold at different months could have very different age and usage mixes. If not
accounted for, this change in the products’ age and usage composition could lead to
fluctuations that are purely due to depreciation effects, thus contaminating the true
latent factors. Therefore, for a particular product model i, we control the age and
usage level as the following:
1. We estimate the model’s usage depreciation coefficient by running the following














Here pilt is the price of model i’s l-th product sold at month t, U
i
lt is its usage
level, Ageilt is its age, and e
i
lt ∼ N(0, σ2i ) is the model error. Because the age of
product l is defined as the difference (in months) between the resale time t and
the production year of the model, Ageilt in (4.1) only varies by the model year
of the product (e.g., whether it is a 2010 Ford Focus or a 2011 one, if model i
under consideration is Ford Focus), and thus only takes a few discrete values.
Therefore, we treat it as a categorical variable in (4.1).
2. We normalize the products’ resale prices at month t to a pre-determined refer-
ence usage level using the corresponding estimates for βit .
2
3. We compute the average normalized prices for model i, Pit, at month t. This
2We use the median of all reliably estimated {βit} values for the normalization if the fitting of
(4.1) at the month under consideration is poor or the reference usage level lies significantly higher
or lower than the observed range of usage levels.
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way we obtain a time series of the average price of this particular model’s used
products under the reference usage level.
4. We define the age index, Ãit, at month t to be the average age of all model i
products sold in month t.
We carry out this procedure for all models within our data set and obtain two time
series for each product model: an average resale price Pit, and an age index Ãit. Here
the price time series Pit should be interpreted as the average resale price of model i at
the reference usage level with age Ãit. We will later use the age index Ãit to control
for the aging effects in our dynamic factor model.
We note that in practice, the usage depreciation (βt) is usually affected by external
factors such as the economic condition and the total product supply at month t.
Therefore, running regression (4.1) at each month automatically controls for these
external factors and yields depreciation coefficients that are conditional on all external
factors at month t (t = 1, 2, . . . , 156). These depreciation coefficients hence allow
us to preserve the influences of external factors on the normalized resale prices for
further investigation. One potential danger with this month-by-month regression
approach is that the resale prices within each month could be too noisy. However, as
our data set contains the nationwide resale prices, it provides adequate sample size
(hundreds or even thousands of items per month) for reliable monthly estimation and
normalization.
We observe that the time series of average resale price Pit are unit root processes.
Therefore, we follow the convention in macroeconometrics (Kose et al. 2003, Eickmeier
2009) and study the growth rates of the resale price of each model. In particular, we
let Yit represent the percentage growth of model i’s resale price in month t + 1 from
month t:
Yit = (logPit+1 − logPit)× 100. (4.2)
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We observe that the age indexes Ãit of two consecutive months have close values.
This is consistent with the intuition that the age mixes of model i’s used products
changes gradually in time, as old models age and new models enter the used market.




(Ãit+1 + Ãit). (4.3)
Then Yit should be interpreted as the percentage growth of model i’s resale price in
month t+ 1 from month t at age Ait and the reference usage level.
Finally, we de-mean both the growth rates and age indexes and denote the corre-
sponding zero-mean processes as yit and ait, respectively.
After data preparation, we obtain a total of 235 models’ monthly growth rates
over 13 years (155 months) from 9 OEMs’ 24 brands. Preliminary analysis shows that
all growth rates processes are stationary. Our following analysis are based on yit and
ait.
4.2.2 Descriptive statistics
Because different models have different launch and termination times, our panel
data is unbalanced. We group the models into five segments based on the product
functionality and an international classification system. For example, in the case of
used vehicles, we can categorize the models into passenger cars, SUVs, pick-ups etc.;
in the case of personal computers, we can categorize them into laptops, desktops,
netbooks etc. Let Ns be the number of product models, or equivalently, number of
time series within segment s (s = 1, 2, . . . , 5). Let Os and Bs be the number of OEMs
and brands within segment s, respectively. Table 4.1 gives the values of N , O, B and
the descriptive statistics on the time series yit within each segment.
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Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics on the models’ growth rates within each segment
This table presents the number of models, brands and OEMs within each segment, as well as
the summary statistics of the length of growth time series. Ns denotes the total number of
models/time series within segment s (s = 1, 2, . . . , 5). Os and Bs represent the number of
OEMs and brands within segment s. TS is the shorthand for time series.
Segment Ns Os Bs
Length of TS
Mean Median Std. dev. Min Max
1 100 9 23 113.7 129.5 36.7 39 155
2 20 7 8 138.0 148.0 25.4 72 155
3 22 9 15 86.1 77.0 36.5 39 153
4 81 9 24 100.3 99.0 35.8 29 155
5 12 7 10 120.2 132.0 34.5 59 155
4.3 Multi-level dynamic factors model
Our research interests lie in studying the comovements among different product
models’ price growth rates. We carry out the study employing a multi-level dynamic
factor model (Moench et al. 2011, Moench and Ng 2011). Particularly, we estab-
lish a state space model within each of the five segments to study their respective
segment-wide factors. Then we pool the five segment factors together and identify
one industry-wide factor. There are two commonly used approaches in dynamic fac-
tor model literature: the state space method (Diebold et al. 2006, Kose et al. 2003,
Koopman et al. 2011) and the principal component analysis (PCA) approach (Bai and
Ng 2002, Eickmeier 2009, Forni and Reichlin 1996). We adopt the former because,
first of all, it can easily handle unbalanced panel data (Durbin and Koopman 2001).
Furthermore, it allows for structural modeling of the system and factor dynamics, and
thus is particularly appealing when our goal is to make inferences on the used goods
market. Lastly, the state space presentation provides an integrated framework that
estimates the factor dynamics and other model parameters together. In the following,
we first propose our model, and then discuss it in detail.
1. On the segment level, we assume that within segment s (s = 1, 2, . . . , 5), model
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i’s price growth rate ysit is driven by a corresponding dynamic segment factor
fst (i = 1, 2, . . . , Ns):
ysit = γ
s










esit ∼ NID(0, δ2si), ũst ∼ NID(0, 1),
cor(ũst, e
s




jt) = 0(i 6= j).
Here in (4.4) cst is the seasonality pattern of segment s models’ price growth
rates, making fst the de-seasonalized segment factor. We assume cst to be
deterministic3 throughout the observation horizon in (4.6). γsi is product model
i’s time-invariant loading on the corresponding segment factor fst + cst. Recall
that ait is the de-meaned age index of used model i. It is used in (4.4) to control
for the varying age index of the growth rates. We note that in (4.4)–(4.6), the
only observed data is the time series of each model’s price growth rate yit and its
de-meaned age index ait. All latent segment factors, the associated seasonality,
measurement errors and state innovations are unobservable.
2. On the industry level, we assume that each segment factor fst are driven by one
3We also fitted the model with stochastic seasonality: cst = −
∑11





NID(0, δ2c ). We observe that δ
2
c is small (∼ 10−5) with large estimation error. Furthermore, our
model parameter estimates and smoothed states are robust to the seasonality specification.
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industry-wide factor:
fst = θsft + gst, (4.7)
ft = ψft−1 + ut. (4.8)
gst = φsgst−1 + ust, (4.9)
ut ∼ NID(0, 1), ust ∼ NID(0, σ2s),
cor(ust, ut) = 0, cor(ust, ult) = 0(s 6= l).
Here ut and ust (s = 1, 2, . . . , 5) represent the industry-wide and segment-
specific shocks, respectively.
We note that in the model above, both fst in (4.4) and gst in (4.7) pertain to a
particular segment s (s = 1, 2, . . . , 5). The key difference between the two is that
while the former accounts for all comovements among the product models’ growth
within segment s, the latter only captures the comovements among these products
after the industry-wide factor ft is controlled. As we will see later, both fst and gst
play important roles in our study. To distinguish between the two, we call fst the
segment factor and gst the controlled segment factor in the rest of the paper.
The multi-level dynamic factor model above is a linear Gaussian system. We now
discuss the model specification in detail.
1. Both the industry and segment factors are autoregressive processes of order 1
(AR(1)). Processes with higher AR orders can also be considered. But we find
that the estimated factors using the Kalman filter and smoother are robust to
the model specification of the factor dynamics.
2. The idiosyncratic errors of each product model, esit in (4.4), are strict white
noise processes. We also fitted model with AR(1) idiosyncratic errors esit, but
the estimated AR coefficients are not significant and the results are similar to
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those from the current model.
3. Factor orthogonality: The segment factors fst are orthogonal to the model-
specific idiosyncratic errors esit. Similarly, the industry factor ft is orthogonal
to the controlled segment factors gst. In addition, the idiosyncratic errors of
different product models are assumed to be orthogonal to each other. So are the
controlled segment factors. These orthogonality assumptions are conventional
in state space models (Kose et al. 2003, Otrok and Whiteman 1998, Gregory
et al. 1997), partly for identification purposes.
4. Identification requirements: Both the segment factors fst and the industry factor
ft are assumed to have unit unconditional variances so that the magnitude of the
loadings γsi in (4.4) and θs in (4.7) are identifiable. To ensure the identifiability
of their signs, we further impose the constraint that the first elements of the
loading vectors γs and θ are positive.
If we combine (4.4) and (4.7) on the segment and industry levels together, we have
(i = 1, 2, . . . , Ns, s = 1, 2, . . . , 5)
ysit = γ
s





= χsift + γ
s





This is the form of the multi-level state space model used in Kose et al. (2003), Stock
and Watson (2009), Gregory et al. (1997) with the counterparts of χsi assumed to
be free parameters. Compared with the earlier “bottom-up” model that works from
the segment level up, (4.10) provides a “top-down” model that directly extracts the
industry factor, the controlled segment factors that are orthogonal to the industry
factor, and the idiosyncratic errors that are orthogonal to all factors. One advantage
of the formulation in (4.4) – (4.9) over (4.10), as noted by Moench et al. (2011),
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is the parsimony of the model by imposing the constraint of χsi = θsγ
s
i . Given
the dimension of our data set (155 × 235), the computational task is formidable
should formulation (4.10) be adopted. A more important reason of our employing
the formulation in (4.4)–(4.9), however, is that besides the controlled segment factors
gst, we are interested in obtaining the segment factors fst as well. Specifically, factors
fst provide a convenient way to control for the segment-level comovements when we
carry out the OEM and brand analysis in Section 4.5. We note that in (4.10), the
controlled segment factor and its associated seasonality always appear simultaneously
and it is thus tempting to combine them into one latent factor. However, because
the segment-specific comovements are highly seasonal, by extracting the seasonality
part cst, we obtain much more accurate estimates for the AR(1) coefficients φ̃s in
(4.5). Furthermore, incorporating the seasonality as a latent state instead of de-
seasonalizing the original observations by differencing allows us to explicitly estimate
each segment’s cst and obtain insights.
For ease of exposition in the rest of the paper, we write (4.4) and (4.7) in matrix
form. On the segment level, we have










ũt = INs , e
s
t = ∆s, s = 1, 2, . . . , 5, (4.11d)




2t, . . . , y
s
Nst
), Ast = (a
s
1t, . . . , a
s
Nst
), Γs = (γ
s
1, . . . , γ
s
Ns
), Λs = (λ
s






1t, . . . , e
s
Nst
), ∆ = diag(δ2s1, . . . , δ
2
sNs
), In is the n-by-n identity matrix, L is the
lag operator (Lft = ft−1).
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(1−ψL)f It = uIt , (4.12b)





where fSt = (f1t, . . . , f5t), f
I
t = ft, Gt = (g1t, . . . , g5t), Θ = (θ1, . . . , θ5), Φ =
(φ1, . . . , φ5), u
S
t = (u1t, . . . , u5t), Σ = diag(σ
2
1, . . . , σ
2
5).
4.4 Industry and segment factors
We estimate our two-level state space model using a multi-step approach. We
start with the state space models (4.11) within each segment and obtain the estimated
segment factors f̂st using Kalman smoother. Then we treat the estimated f̂st as “data”
in the industry state space model (4.12) and estimate the industry and controlled
segment factors. Given the dimension of our data set (235 times series in total),
this sequential estimation method greatly reduces the computational burden than if
estimated the entire model at once. Similar approach is also used in a series of papers
on yield curve dynamics such as Diebold et al. (2008) and Diebold and Li (2006).
In particular, Diebold et al. (2008) establish a multi-level factors model on the bond
prices issued by different governments. In the first step, they estimate the latent
factors for each country using Kalman smoother. In the second step, they use the set
of estimated country factors as the “data” to compute the global factor.
Within segment s (s = 1, 2, . . . , 5), the parameters to be estimated are: the loading
vectors Γs and Λs, the Ns variances of marginal distribution of the idiosyncratic errors
est , and the AR coefficient φ̃s. These are a total of 3Ns + 1 parameters. By Table 4.1,
this number ranges from 37 to 301 in the five segments we have. On the industry
level, we need to estimate the segment loadings Θ, the AR coefficients Φ and ψ,
97
and the variance matrix ΣS of u
S
t . That is, 26 free parameters in the second step.
We estimate all model parameters under the maximum loglikelihood principle. More
explicitly, we maximize the logarithmic of the joint probability of all observed growth
rates yit, which has an analytical expression based on our models (4.11) and (4.12)
(see e.g. Durbin and Koopman (2001)). Solving this optimization problem presents a
challenging computational task. We use the package by Ghalanos and Theussl (2012)
written in the R environment. To ensure the robustness of our results to the initial
conditions of our optimization, we estimate the every model using 30 times with
randomized initial conditions and use the estimates with the maximum loglikelihood
as the reference. We found that the point estimates of the model parameters from
the rest 29 runs are not significantly different from the reference estimates at 95%
significance level using z-tests. We also found that the segment and industry factors
from the rest 29 runs are highly correlated with the factors under the reference run,
with correlation over 0.9. These results confirm that our results are robust to the
initial conditions of the algorithm and thus likely to be the global optimum over the
feasible region. In the following, we report the results of the reference run. All the
factors are estimated using Kalman smoother under these parameters.
4.4.1 Latent dynamic factors
This section studies the industry factor f It and controlled segment factors Gt in
(4.12). We consider the controlled segment factors rather than the segment factors
because the former is more informative on segment-level comovements when the in-
dustry factor is also examined.
Table 4.2 presents the parameter estimation results for (4.12). We see that all
segments have significant loadings on the industry factor. Recall that the shocks to
industry factor ut has unit variance. Thus, these large loadings indicate that there
are remarkable comovements among different segments. In addition, comparing with
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the estimated variance of the controlled segment factor shocks ust (s = 1, 2, . . . , 5),
we see that industry-wide shocks account for a significant portion of the variability
in segment factors fst.
Table 4.2: Loadings of the industry factor and variance of shocks to controlled segment
factors
Seg. 1 Seg. 2 Seg. 3 Seg. 4 Seg. 5
Industry loading θ
0.76 0.69 0.58 0.81 0.79
(0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
Controlled segment factor shocks σ2
0.36 0.43 0.24 0.25 0.16
(0.06) (0.07) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04)
Figure 4.1 presents the estimated industry and controlled segment factors with the
significance bands at 1.64 standard deviations. The red point corresponds to Sept.
2008, when Lehman Brothers filed bankruptcy. By figure (4.1a), we see that at the
height of the 2008 financial crisis, the estimated industry factor plunged over 4.5%,
the most substantial drop over the entire 13-year observation horizon. This indicates
that the entire class of the used goods under consideration experienced a remarkable
price decline during financial crisis. In particular, from the segment loadings in Table
4.2, segments 1, 4 and 5 have the strongest comovements with the industry factors
and are thus affected the most among all five segments.
Figures (4.1b – 4.1f) present the controlled segment factors gst (s = 1, . . . , 5) in
(4.7) and (4.12). By construction, gst is orthogonal to the industry factor f
I
t . There-
fore, it captures the latent factors peculiar to each segment, thus allowing further
investigation and comparison of the segment-specific price dynamics. While we can-
not disclose the segment names due to confidentiality reasons, we note that segments
1 and 3 are mostly for individual uses with segment 3 products being fancier and more
pricey; segments 2 is mainly for industrial/commercial uses, segment 4 is primarily
for family uses, and segment 5 for both family and commercial uses. In Figure 4.1,
we observe significant controlled factors for all segments except the hybrid segment
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(segment 5). Along with the low variance value of segment 5 shocks reported in Table
4.2, this indicates that the latent factor for segment 5, f5t, is not significantly differ-
ent from the industry factor. This observation is likely due to the hybrid nature of
segment 5 products. Controlled factors of the rest four segments all have distinctive
dynamics, especially in the way they respond to the financial crisis. The controlled
factor of ordinary individual goods (segment 1) suffer a steep and prolonged drop dur-
ing the financial crisis. Compared with other segments and particularly the pricey
individual goods (segment 3), segment 1 controlled factor takes the longest time to
recover to the original level before crisis. The controlled factor of commercial and
family goods (segments 2 and 4), on the other hand, are hit by the crisis five months
earlier than all other segments.
Figure 4.1 sheds some light on the pattern of industry-wide and segment-specific
comovements. In practice, however, we are also interested in the comovements among
different product models within the same segment, that is, the segment factor fst
itself (s = 1, . . . , 5). In addition, we’d like to see how the industry and controlled
segment factors compare with each other within each segment. Therefore, we plot
the loaded industry factors θsf
I
t , the controlled segment factors gst, and the segment
factor fst in Figure 4.2. By equation (4.7), fst = θsf
I
t + gst. Hence, these plots
visualize the respective contributions of the industry and controlled factors to the price
growth fluctuation within each segment. We observe that the segment-specific factors
of ordinary individual goods and commercial goods (segment 1 and 2) are of the
same magnitude as the corresponding loaded industry factors, whereas the industry
factor dominates the controlled segment factor within other segments. Furthermore,
combining the two factors together, we see that the price of individual goods (segments
1 and 3) experiences a sudden decline in Sept. 2008, while the price of commercial
and family goods (segment 2 and 4) drops five months earlier. This difference in the
response times might be due to the fact that the 2008 financial crisis was developed
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(a) Industry factor (b) Segment 1 factor
(c) Segment 2 factor (d) Segment 3 factor
(e) Segment 4 factor (f) Segment 5 factor
Figure 4.1: Estimated industry and controlled segment factors. 1.64 standard deviation
(i.e., 90% significance level) band. The red dot corresponds to Sept. 2008, the bankruptcy
of Lehman Brothers.
from subprime mortgage crisis and, thus, influenced companies financing and families
first before the critical point when Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy shocked the entire
economy. In addition, among all segments, the ordinary individual goods sees the
biggest and longest decline following the financial crisis. This is also consistent with
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macroeconomic reports on the lagging consumer confidence and high unemployment
rates in the long recession period afterwards. In particular, because the ordinary
individual goods are the least expensive segment of the entire industry, the majority
of their buyers earn low/medium wages and are thus more likely to be affected by the
crisis.
4.4.2 Persistence properties of the factors
The persistence of a time series characterizes how autocorrelated the series is. A
crude way of describing a univariate time series’ persistence is to use the autocorrela-
tion plot. The slower the autocorrelation function decays, the greater the persistence.
By Figure 4.1, we can already see strong persistence in the industry and segment fac-
tors. In this section, we measure the persistence explicitly by the AR(1) coefficients
φ̃s, ψ and φs (s = 1, . . . , 5) in (4.5), (4.8) and (4.9). Similar approaches have also
been used in e.g. Kose et al. (2003), Eickmeier (2009).






Seg. 1 Seg. 2 Seg. 3 Seg. 4 Seg. 5
AR(1) coefficient φs
0.66 0.58 0.57 0.49 0.2
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.1)
Segment factors
Seg. 1 Seg. 2 Seg. 3 Seg. 4 Seg. 5
AR(1) coefficient φ̃s
0.56 0.52 0.54 0.53 0.53
(0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.07) (0.08)
By the upper and middle panels of Table 4.3, both the industry and controlled
segment factors are quite persistent. This result indicates that whenever a shock
occurs on the industry or segment level, its effect on the corresponding factor will















































Figure 4.2: Loaded industry factor (solid black), controlled segment factor (dashed black)
and segment factor (dotted red).
family goods (segments 1 to 4), industry-wide shocks and segment-specific shocks are
equally persistent in terms of their effects on the resale prices. For goods in the hybrid
segment (segment 5), however, industry-wide shocks are much more persistent.
The lower panel of Table 4.3 presents the persistence of the segment factors fst
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directly. As expected from Figure 4.2 and the upper panels of Table 4.3, the segment
factors are highly persistent.
The ultimate goal of our persistence study is to evaluate the impact of a random
shock on the latent factors, and consequently the resale prices, over time. There are
roughly two types of shocks based on their scope of influence: A “local” shock that
only pertains to a subset of segments (e.g., supply/demand shocks of commercial
goods); and a “global” shock (e.g., financial crisis, natural disaster) that affects the
entire used goods market. Apparently, in cases of a “local” shock, we can evaluate
its impacts into the future using the persistence properties of the corresponding con-
trolled segment factors. In cases of a “global” shock, however, it can be particularly
challenging to decouple the shock into the orthogonal industry- and segment-level
shocks, ut and ust (s = 1, . . . , 5), defined in (4.8) and (4.9). Indeed, as an ex post
analysis, Figure 4.1 illustrates how distinctive ut and ust can be in case of a financial
crisis. As a result, evaluating the future impacts of a “global” shock via the indus-
try and controlled segment factors becomes difficult. This complication, however,
could be easily avoided by using persistence properties of the segment factors di-
rectly. Therefore, Table 4.3 provides the necessary information to estimate the future
impacts of a random shock on the resale prices.
4.4.3 Variance decomposition
In our multi-level dynamic factors model, we assume that (i) there is strong co-
movement among the product models within the same segment, which is captured by
the segment factor; and (ii) there is strong comovement among different segments,
which is captured by the industry factor. Section 4.4.1 illustrates that there is indeed
strong comovement among the segment factors. In this section we further quantify
the extent to which each segment factor is driven by the common industry factor, as
well as the comovement level among the product models within the same segment.
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To do this, we need to account for the way different segments (product models) loads
the corresponding latent factors and their own idiosyncratic errors. Variance decom-
position is a standard approach in factor analysis that serves this purpose (Kose et al.
2003, Gregory et al. 1997, Otrok and Whiteman 1998).
We assume that the controlled segment factors are orthogonal to the industry
factor, and that the product-specific errors are orthogonal to the segment factors in
(4.12) and (4.11). The estimated factors from the finite sample, however, could be
correlated even if they are not in the population. Indeed, we observe weak correlation
(|ρ| ∈ (10−5, 0.3)) between (gSt , f It ) and (fst, est). Therefore, we orthogonalize gSt and
f It by regressing the segment factors on the industry factor f
I
t , and replacing the
loadings with the regression coefficient and the controlled segment factors with the
regression error (Diebold et al. 2008). Similarly, we orthogonalize fst and e
s
it by
regressing product i’s growth rate on the seasonal factor (fst + cst) and the age index
ait, replacing the loadings and the idiosyncratic errors with the regression coefficients
and residuals. Then on the industry level, by (4.7) we have
var(fst) = θ
2
svar(ft) + var(gst). (4.13)







We note that in the measurement equation (4.4), the seasonality cst and the age index
ait are both deterministic, thus not entering (4.14).
By the state equations (4.5), (4.8) and (4.9), the unconditional variances of the









Then the proportion of the segment s variability that can be explained by the industry
factor is (s = 1, . . . , 5)
ws =
θ2s/(1− ψ2)
θ2s/(1− ψ2) + var(gst)
. (4.16)
The proportion of the product model i’s variability that can be explained by the





2/(1− φ̃2s) + var(esit)
. (4.17)
Table 4.4 presents the variance decomposition results. The upper panel shows that
the industry factor accounts for a significant portion of each segment factor’s variation,
confirming our earlier observation from Figure 4.2. The lower panel reports the
range of the segment factor’s contributions to each product’s price growth variability.
We see that, despite the large number of product models within segment 1 and 4
(100 and 81, respectively, see Table 4.1), the latent factors still explain remarkable
fractions of individual product’s variation. This result indicates that there are strong
comovements within these two segments, i.e., ordinary individual goods and family
goods. In comparison, although segment 3 of pricey individual goods includes only 22
models, the explanatory power of the corresponding latent factor is much lower than
other factors, implying stronger heterogeneity among the pricey individual products.
This observation is consistent with our intuition that fancy and up-scale products
tend to distinguish from each other more than ordinary ones, thus attracting different
consumers and have different resale price dynamics.
4.5 OEM analysis
Section 4.3 examines the comovements among products with similar functionali-
ties by grouping them into a few segments. In this section, we study the comovements
of products with the same brand/OEM. In practice, one brand/OEM can cover sev-
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Table 4.4: Variance decomposition
For each segment factor/product price, we decompose its variation into two parts: one from the
industry/segment-level comovement, the other from the segment/product-specific errors. The
upper panel presents the proportion of each segment factor’s variation that can be explained
by the industry factor. The lower panel presents the proportion of each product’s price growth
variation that can be explained by the corresponding segment factor. (“perc.” is a shorthand
for percentile.)
Industry level
Seg. 1 Seg. 2 Seg. 3 Seg. 4 Seg. 5
ws (%) 60.6 55.7 71.8 82.3 92.3
Segment level
5th perc. 25th perc. Median 75th perc. 95th perc.
Seg. 1: w1(%) 6.2 13.7 20.8 37.1 52.2
Seg. 2: w2(%) 15.2 18.6 31.6 48.7 81.4
Seg. 3: w3(%) 7.2 9.7 14.3 23.5 28.4
Seg. 4: w4(%) 5.8 13.7 23.6 34.2 45.5
Seg. 5: w5(%) 26.3 29.2 32.6 42.1 58.9
eral segments. Take the automotive industry for example. OEM Toyota has two
brands, Toyota and Lexus, each of which produces a range of models in passenger
car, SUV and pick-up segments. From earlier analysis, we already know that there is
strong comovement among products with similar functionalities. Therefore, to avoid
confounding effects from the segment dimension, we examine the OEM- and brand-
level comovements after the earlier identified segment factors have been controlled.
The meaning of these OEM- and brand-level comovements then is two-fold. First,
the price dynamics of all products within a particular segment break into smaller
blocks in brands and/or OEMs. Second, after controlling for the segment factors,
products of the same brand and/or OEM but different segments still exhibit strong
comovements. In other words, we aim to answer the following questions: Are there
OEM- and brand-specific factors driving the product’s price dynamics on top of the
segment factors? And if so, more importantly, how would an incident such as product
recall and brand termination affect the OEM and brand factors on the resale prices?
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In the following, we will first propose our model, and then discuss the results.
4.5.1 Model on OEM and brand factors
As we are now interested in the OEM- and brand-level latent factors, we index the
growth rate of product model i’s resale price by its brand b and OEM o in addition
to the segment s. We consider 6 large OEMs observed in our data set, each of which
produces 2 to 5 brands with 14 to 52 product models. Notation-wise, we write ysit as
ysobit to reflect the brand and OEM information. Furthermore, let f̂st and ĉst denote the
estimated segment factor and its seasonality from the multi-level model (s = 1, . . . , 5).
Our measurement equation for the latent factors is then
ysobit = η
o






it + χi(f̂st + ĉst) + ξ
sob
it , (4.18)
ξsobit ∼ NID(0, σ̃2i ).
where o = 1, . . . , 6, s = 1, . . . , 5, b = 1, . . . , Bo, i = 1, . . . , No. Bo and No denote the
number of brands and product models manufactured by OEM o.
In the measurement equation (4.18), we used the factors f̂st + ĉst estimated from
(4.11) as exogenous variables. This approach is similar to the widely used factor-
augmented regression and forecasting (e.g. Stock and Watson 2001, Ludvigson and
Ng 2007, Bai and Ng 2008, Moench and Ng 2011). In particular, Bai and Ng (2006)
prove that the least squares estimates from these factor-augmented regressions are
consistent and asymptotically normal, and that the first-stage estimation of the fac-
tors does not affect the consistency of the second-stage parameter estimates. Our
OEM model above extends some of the existing work in factor-augmented regression
in that we further impose a two-level dynamic factor model on the regression errors.
108












where both uot and u
o
bt are orthogonal strict white noise processes with unit variance.
4.5.2 OEM and brand factors
We estimate the model parameters and factors as before using the MLE approach
with 30 randomized initial parameter values. We find that the parameter estimates
for the loadings, η1, η2 and χ, the coefficient of the age index, λ̃, and the idiosyncratic
error variance σ̃2i are robust to the initial parameter values of the optimization. The
OEM factors estimated from different runs are also highly correlated. The brand
factors under each OEM, however, do not always exhibit high correlation. This result
suggests that after controlling for the segment factors, while there is still strong
comovement among products of the same OEM, the brand-level comovement is not
always present. In other words, these brands are not significantly different from each
other after controlling for the segment factors, thus could be captured by a common
OEM factor. In the following, we report the result with the highest log-likelihood of
all runs.
Table 4.5 shows the estimates for AR(1) coefficients κo and κob in (4.19) (o =
1, . . . , 6, b = 1, . . . , Bo). Only results of factors that are robust to the initial values
are reported, otherwise indicated with a “−” sign. Comparing with the persistence
results in Table 4.3, we see that most factors are much less persistent than the segment
factors, except for OEMs 1 and 4. This result suggests that for most products,
the segment factors capture their most persistent, or low frequency comovements.
Consequently, when an OEM- or brand-level shock occurs, most OEMs and brands
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recover quickly to the prior-shock state while OEMs 1 and 4 endure a lasting impact.
This high persistence of OEM 1 and 4’s factors might indicate that unlike other brands
and OEMs, these two OEMs have developed their own particular images among the
consumers.
Table 4.5: Persistence of OEM and brand factors
We report the AR(1) coefficients of the OEM and brand factors. κo is the AR(1) coefficient
for OEM o. κoi (i = 1, 2, . . . , 5) is the AR(1) coefficient for OEM o’s i-th brand. Entries “−”
mean that the corresponding brand factors are not robust to the optimization initial conditions,
thus their results not presented. Blanks are used when the corresponding brands do not exist.











OEM 1 0.52(0.08) − − 0.4(0.1)
OEM 2 -0.1(0.1) − − 0.4(0.1)
OEM 3 0.3(0.1) − − -0.1(0.1) − -0.82(0.09)
OEM 4 0.6(0.1) 0.3(0.1) 0.4(0.1)
OEM 5 -0.2(0.1) 0.5(0.1) −
OEM 6 0.3(0.1) -0.1(0.1) -0.65(0.1)
The state space model (4.18-4.19) on different OEMs provides a convenient way of
studying how OEM- and brand-level shocks affect the products’ resale price dynamics.
This is a particularly relevant question in business operations. In the following, we
examine the following two incidents: product recalls and brand termination.
Over our observation horizon, OEM 4 announced a large-scale product recall on
almost 50% of its brand 1 product models. Given the persistence results in Table 4.5,
we expect the impact of this recall to last a relatively long period. However, to what
extent is the brand 1 factor influenced? Are there significant spill-over effects so that
the brand 2 factor and even the OEM factor also suffered? These are the questions of
particular interest and we answer them next. By the estimated OEM factor in Figure
4.3a, this recall has not caused a wide-spread resale price decline for all products
from OEM 4. The impact on the brand being recalled, however, is significant and
lasting as shown in Figure 4.3b. The brand 1 factor dropped more than 4% at the
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recall announcement, indicating a sizable decline in the resale prices of all brand 1
products. The brand 2 products, on the other hand, were only slightly affected, if at
all (Figure 4.3c). This result implies that there is little spill-over effects of the large-
scale recall on brand 1. This might be linked to our earlier observation that brand 1
and 2 products are driven by separate brand factors (Table 4.5), suggesting that they
exhibit significantly different price dynamics and probably perceived distinctively by
the consumers.
(a) OEM 4
(b) Brand 1 (c) Brand 2
Figure 4.3: Impacts of product recalls. (a-c) plot OEM 4’s OEM and brand factors with
1.64 standard deviation (i.e., 90% significance level) band. In Jan. 2010 (red dot), several
brand 1 product models were recalled.
During 2000–2012, two OEMs terminated their brands. OEM 1 terminated pro-
duction for its brand 2 around the end of 2011, while OEM 2 terminated its brand
3 around the end of 2010. We are interested in examining how these brand termina-
tion affects the products’ price dynamics. On one hand, the termination might result
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in decreasing resale prices as when all operations related to a particular brand are
stopped, repairing and servicing its products becomes harder for the buyers. This
additional maintenance cost could then be priced in when these products are sold.
On the other hand, although the brand is terminated, the OEM still operates nor-
mally. In fact, when OEMs terminate a brand in practice, they always accompany
the termination announcement with detailed product repair and maintenance support
to alleviate such concerns from the consumers. If effective, this policy might lead to
small additional costs in product maintenance, if at all. Therefore, whether the brand
termination has significant impacts on the OEM and corresponding brand factors is
not clear, and thus worthwhile to understand.
Figure 4.4 shows the estimated OEM factors of OEM 1 and 2, and the estimated
brand 3 factor of OEM 2. Because we do not observe significant comovement among
OEM 1’s brand 2 products, we do not show the corresponding brand factor. We note
that the large uncertainty of the estimated brand factor at the early period (2000–
2004) is due to a lack of data within that time frame. From Figure 4.4, we cannot
detect any unusual movements around the termination time in the OEM and brand
factors. This indicates that when the OEM operates normally, brand termination
does not have a material impact on the resale prices of related products or products
of other brands.
4.6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we study the comovements of resale prices of a particular type of
used durable goods using the US data during 2010:1 – 2012:12. In particular, we
identify the comovements of products within each functionality segment, across the
entire industry, and within each brand and OEM after the segment-level comovements
are controlled for. At the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt of applying
dynamic factor models developed in macroeconomics to a problem with an operational
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(a) OEM 1
(b) OEM 2 (c) Brand 3
Figure 4.4: Impacts of brand termination. (a-c) plot OEM 2’s OEM and brand factors
with 1.64 standard deviation (i.e., 90% significance level) band. Around the end of 2011 and
2010 (red dots), OEM 1 terminated brand 2 and OEM 2 terminated brand 3, respectively.
nature.
In the industry and segment-level analysis, we find that despite the heterogeneity
in brand, OEM, etc., the resale prices of the products are strongly affected by the
corresponding segment factor. This dependence on the segment factor, or equiva-
lently, the level of within-segment comovement, however, varies with segment. In
particular, the segment with fancy and pricey products exhibits weaker comovement
than others. Furthermore, we illustrate that all segment factors are quite persistent,
indicating lasting impacts from random shocks.
In the OEM analysis, we report that there are strong comovements among prod-
ucts of the same OEM after their corresponding segment factors are controlled for.
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However, given a particular OEM, its products under different brands do not always
distinguish from each other. We show that the OEM and brand factors are much
less persistent than the segment factors, consistent with our intuition. Finally, we
find that brand termination does not have a material impact on the corresponding
products’ resale prices, while a big recall could induce a significant price drop.
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CHAPTER V
Conclusion and future work
In this dissertation, I study three types of uncertainties in industrial practice: the
demand uncertainty, the earnings uncertainty and the external market uncertainty. In
particular, Chapter II prices the demand uncertainties in the just-in-time outsourcing
between an OEM and a CM; Chapter III proposes a model for the provider to manage
his earnings uncertainties using contracts in managed print services; Chapter IV aims
to understand the uncertainties of the external market trend and market responses
using resale prices of used durable goods.
Our study of demand risk pricing in just-in-time outsourcing is one of the first
attempts to price demand risks in component outsourcing in JIT literature. We
account for the flexible production capacity feature of component outsourcing and
show that when the outsourcing demand is positively correlated with the agent’s
existing business, the higher risk it carries, the more the outsourcing costs the CM
and benefits the OEM. One possible extension of this study is incorporating the
outsourcing demand as OEM’s decision variable depending on its in-house production
capacity, inventory level, etc. This will lead to an optimization problem with the
decision being the optimal capacity/inventory from the risk perspective. Another
interesting direction to pursue is extending the model to scenarios where the OEM’s
order arrives randomly over the contract horizon. Intuitively price of demand risks
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becomes higher as there are now two sources of randomness: the uncertainty in
demand quantities and the uncertainty of the order placement.
In the empirical study on the managed print services, we examine contractual
interactions between the managed print service provider and customers using propri-
etary data sets provided by Xerox. We develop two models: one on the customer’s
service payments, and the other on the provider’s selection among the set of con-
tracts acceptable to the customer obtained from the first model. To the best of our
knowledge, this paper is the first in-depth study of pricing in managed services. Our
approach provides a new way of tackling information asymmetry between service
providers and customers under inelastic service usage. It offers a viable construct for
studies on managed services for institutional customers.
Chapter IV examines the price dynamics of resale prices of a type of used durable
goods using dynamic factor models. We identify the underlying market trends of
the industry of interest and quantify the impact of external economic shocks such
as the financial crisis. Furthermore, we study the impact of how certain operational
decisions of a company’s senior management could impact the resale prices of the
products. Specifically, we find that, while a large-scale product recall leads to a
significant drop in product prices, this price-drop effect is rather “local” and does
not spill over to other brands produced by the same manufacturer. We also find that
the termination of a brand does not have a material impact on the corresponding
products’ resale prices, possibly due to the fact that the OEM behind the brand still
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and the yield curve: A dynamic latent factor approach. Journal of Econometrics 131
309–338.
Dinges, T. 2011. Electronics contract manufacturing market growth slows in 2011.
Dong, Y., C. R. Carter, M. E. Dresner. 2001. Jit purchasing and performance: an ex-
ploratory analysis of buyer and supplier perspectives. Journal of Operations Manage-
ment 19 471–483.
Duenyas, I., W. J. Hopp, Y. Bassok. 1997. Production quotas as bounds on interplant JIT
contracts. Management Science 43(10) 1372–1386.
Durbin, James, Siem Jan Koopman. 2001. Time series analysis by state space methods.
Oxford Univ Press.
Eickmeier, S., J. Breitung. 2006. How synchronized are new eu member states with the euro
area? evidence from a structural factor model. Journal of Comparative Economics 34
538–563.
Eickmeier, Sandra. 2009. Comovements and heterogeneity in the euro area analyzed in a
non-stationary dynamic factor model. Journal of Applied Econometrics 24 933–959.
Essegaier, Skander, Sunil Gupta, John Z. Zhang. 2002. Pricing access services. Marketing
Science 21 139–159.
Fandel, G., J. Reese. 1991. Just-in-time logistics of a supplier in the car manufacturing
industry. International Journal Production Economics 24 55–64.
Fitzmaurice, Garrett, Nan Laird, James Ware. 2004. Applied Longitudinal Analysis. John
Wiley & Sons.
Forni, Mario, Lucrezia Reichlin. 1996. Dynamic common factors in large cross-sections.
Empirical Economics 21 27–42.
Gaur, V., S. Seshadri. 2005. Hedging inventory risk through market instruments. Manu-
facturing and Service Operations Management 7(2) 103–120.
Ghalanos, Alexios, Stefan Theussl. 2012. Rsolnp: General Non-linear Optimization Using
Augmented Lagrange Multiplier Method . R package.
Goettler, R.L., K.B. Clay. 2010. Tariff choice with consumer learning and switching costs.
URL http://ssrn.com/abstract=885573.
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